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Centre and periphery or multipolar economic order?中心与边缘或多极化的经济秩序？ 从一个订单到另一个的过渡的引用现在是常见的，因为是试图提供一个理论框架，可以充分代表新的结构。随着新的大型和不断增长的经济体的出现推动了这一转变，扩大了全球的经济竞争领域，就必须制定一个新的范例，能够捕捉到新世界的复杂性。联邦储备委员会主席本·伯南克在他在堪萨斯市的年度经济研讨会上的开幕词中含蓄地表达了一个新的范式的必要性。他评论伯南克指中心和外围之间的传统区分的19世纪的模式，其中核心出口厂商在商品交换的边缘，看到它不再能够捕捉当前经济秩序的复杂性，为越来越多的世界制造能力是现在新兴市场的发现。7 4本纳科特和罗伯特E.利坦的方向，金融治国（纽黑文，CT和伦敦：耶鲁大学出版社，2006），页3。5苏珊奇怪，“什么理论？在疯狂赚钱”的理论，对全球化和区域化，华威大学的研究中心工作论文18 / 98，1998，6页。6另一种观点认为，在国际关系的现实主义者，一些经济学家顽强，是国家权力的侵蚀被夸大了，变化体现在全球化一词已不亚于对面的学校说：奇怪，什么理论？“，17页。7本伯南克，'全球经济一体化：什么是新的，什么不是？'，就职演说，联邦储备银行堪萨斯市第三十年度经济座谈会上，杰克逊洞，怀俄明，25月2006。The rapid transformation of the world economic order and the widespread perception that some structural and irreversible changes are under way have focused debate on the likely shape of the new order. References to the transition from one order to the other are now common, as are attempts to provide a theoretical framework that can adequately represent the structure of the new one. As the transition is driven by the emergence of new large and growing economies, widening the global economic playing field, it becomes necessary to devise a new paradigm that can capture the complexity of the new world. The need for a new paradigm was implicitly expressed by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in his opening remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium in 2006. In his comments Bernanke refers to the traditional distinction between centre and periphery— ‘the nineteenth-century pattern, in which the core exported manufactures to the periphery in exchange for commodities’—and sees it as no longer able to capture the complexity of the current economic order, ‘as an increasing share of world manufacturing capacity is now found in emerging markets’.7 The direction of 4 Benn Steil and Robert E. Litan, Financial statecraft (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 3. 5 Susan Strange, ‘What theory? The theory in mad money’, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, working paper 18/98, 1998, p. 6. 6 ‘The alternative view, tenaciously held by realists in international relations and some economists, is that the erosion of state power has been exaggerated and that the changes encapsulated in the term globalisation have not been nearly as great as the opposite school asserts’: Strange, ‘What theory?’, p. 17. 7 Ben S. Bernanke, ‘Global economic integration: what’s new and what’s not?’, inaugural speech, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Thirtieth Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25 Aug. 2006. New power centres and new power brokers 487 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs capital flows is another striking aspect of the breakdown of the core–periphery paradigm. ‘In the nineteenth century, the country at the center of the world’s economy, Great Britain, ran current account surpluses and exported financial capital to the periphery. Today, the world’s largest economy, that of the United States, runs a current account deficit, financed to a substantial extent by capital exports from emerging-market nations.’ Bernanke’s reference to the centre–periphery model is striking as it brings back into the debate an analytical tool that was particularly popular in the 1960s. Besides suggesting that the rapid transformations and economic development of some countries and regions pose the sort of issues and challenges that were common in the 1960s,8 the revival of the centre–periphery model provides some familiar points of reference for defining the world economic order. However, while it tells us what the current order is not, it does not tell what it is. In its ‘classic’ formulation, the centre–periphery model maintains that the world economic system is organized around two poles that are linked in an asymmetric power relation, where the centre controls and influences the periphery. Pre-eminent in manufacturing, the centre exports financial capital and high-value manufactured goods to the periphery in exchange for commodities and low-value goods.9 For example, in the years following the Second World War the United States supported the exports of the fast-growing economies of Western Europe and Japan through a relatively open market for imports of foreign goods, despite asymmetric treatment of US exports in Europe and Japan. An implicit bargain was struck, according to which these countries accepted a hegemonic system that gave the United States an expanding role in foreign policy.10 In recent years the model has been extended to include, in the centre, all countries with open capital markets and market-determined exchange rates— such as the United States and the euro-zone—and, in the periphery, all countries with relatively closed capital markets and managed exchange rates—such as China, developing Asia and oil-exporting countries.11 In this formulation the centre issues the main international reserve currency and keeps it stable in terms of its purchasing power over tradable goods and services—as the dollar was in the 1950s and 1960s, and as it has become once more from the mid-1990s into the new millennium.12 8 Such as, for example, persistent imbalances, undervalued currencies and US involvement in unpopular and expensive military operations. 9 The subordination of the periphery, moreover, extended to political issues. 10 See Benjamin J. Cohen, ‘Bretton Woods system’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 84–91; Paola Subacchi, ‘From Bretton Woods onwards: the birth and rebirth of the world’s hegemon’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, forthcoming. 11 Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, ‘An essay on the revised Bretton Woods system’, working paper 9971 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003). 12 Floating exchange rates are very much the product of financial maturity and the development of institutions and rules that allow policy-makers to follow stable monetary and fiscal policy without adhering to an external nominal anchor. See Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreau, ‘Core, periphery, exchange rate regimes and globalization’, working paper 8584 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001), p. 45. Countries in the periphery, which have always faced serious difficulties in floating, have pegged their currencies. Recent financial crises, especially that in Asia in 1997, have shown that pegging may be the best solution in the absence of deep domestic financial markets and of domestic policies and credible institutions that could create a domestic anchor. Paola Subacchi 488 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs Then countries in the periphery willingly peg their currencies to the key currency in order to anchor their own price levels more reliably,13 control their exchange rates and avoid any currency appreciation that would undermine the competitiveness of their exports, while accumulating safe, low-yield securities issued by the centre. The periphery’s reserve accumulation is an important source of finance for the centre’s current account deficit, keeping interest rates in the centre lower than they would otherwise be.14 The distinction between centre and periphery remains a powerful concept, but does not capture the complexity of the current economic order. Today a growing share of world manufacturing capacity is found in emerging market economies, which increasingly supply developed economies with manufactured goods. Unlike the past when the centre—Britain—exported capital and had a current account surplus, now the world’s largest economy, that of the United States, runs a current account deficit. This is financed to a substantial extent by capital exports from emerging market nations. More importantly, the US current account deficit has undermined the dollar’s ability to provide exchange rate stability to countries that peg their currencies to it.15 Since 2002 the dollar has been depreciating in tradeweighted terms, breaking a 20-year pattern of appreciation and starting an unprecedented long decline. Finally, the centre–periphery model bundles together under the same label similar outcomes that have different causes—for instance, current account surpluses from countries with different paths of economic development, such as China and commodity-exporting countries. Similarly, it does not make any provision for developed countries or regions that have floating currencies— such as Europe and Japan—but lack the ability to finance deficits with their own currencies. The complexity of today’s world economy, with a changing cast of actors and an expanding playing field, suggests a shift to a multipolar structure where many players interact with one another.16 This is a visually powerful representation which captures the new prominence of countries that previously played a marginal role—on the ‘periphery’. In this sense, a multipolar structure could be regarded as the logical replacement of the centre–periphery model. However, in its current formulation such a theoretical framework is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it does not address the issue of how power is distributed. Second, it implicitly assumes that economic power is correlated with the size of a single country’s economy, using the size of GDP—actual or potential—as a proxy for economic power. Third, it uses the national state as the reference unit in the global distribution of economic power. Reasoning in terms of national economies 13 Ideally, the centre country should have no exchange rate objectives of its own, and so be able to follow an independent monetary policy focused solely on stabilizing its own price level. 14 Dooley et al., ‘An essay’, p. 18. 15 The US current account deficit has, however, recently narrowed, falling from just over $810 billion in 2006 to $745 billion in 2007. 16 Emerging countries such as China prefer multipolarity, which promotes their status and minimizes the role played by the United States. See Robert A. Kapp, ‘The big crap shoot’, China Economic Quarterly 12:1, March 2008, p. 27.#p#分页标题#e# New power centres and new power brokers 489 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs provides a good visual representation, but is inadequate as it ignores the complexity of today’s economic relations.17 Defining power 定义电源 Power is a relative concept—not everyone can have equal power—that defines, to cite the Compact Oxford Dictionary of Current English, ‘the ability to do something or act in a particular way’ and ‘the capacity to influence other people or the course of events’. In some situations, such as warfare, the deployment of power results in a classic zero-sum game which leaves the other party worse off. In the case of open and well-integrated economies, however, the deployment of power rarely results in a zero-sum game. This is because, in a globally competitive environment, widespread economic capacity creates options for all parties involved.18 As more players come to prominence, power is diffused more widely. Such diffusion undermines the capacity of any one player to achieve its preferred ends by means of coercion—or persuasion.19 Looking at the increased integration among the world’s main regions— Europe, Asia and the United States—and the growth of global markets, which have expanded economic activity and brought in new players, one can conclude that economic power has become more widely diffused among a widening array of global actors, including both state and non-state actors. It is important to note here that a correlation exists between the diffusion of power and globalization. The former could not happen without the latter. In other words, it is the level of integration in the world economy, rather than the sheer size of their economies, that empowers new players.20 However, the diffusion of power and the widening of the playing field reduce the ability of each player to influence others, with the result that the exercise of leadership becomes much harder. This means that sheer size and increased involvement in the world economy may confer power in the dimension of autonomy—that is, the capacity for action—but does not necessarily confer power in the dimension of influence.21 In the case of China, for instance, one can argue that autonomy has increased as a result of the country’s opening its economy. Although it is difficult to measure a concept such as autonomy, qualitative evidence shows that China enjoys a more prominent role on the global scene today than it did in 1980, when the country was almost invisible to the rest of the world. The difference in economic size, 17 Or perhaps it is because of the complexity of such relations that the economic size of a country—in terms of both world share of GDP and income per capita—is often used as a proxy for economic power. 18 On the issue of economic power, see Richard Cooper, ‘Is “economic power” a useful and operational concept?’, discussion draft, Harvard University, Department of Economics, 2003; DeAnne Julius, ‘US economic power: waxing or waning?’, Harvard International Review 26: 4 , Winter 2005, pp. 14–18. 19 See Cooper, ‘Is “economic power” a useful and operational concept?’; Benjamin J. Cohen, ‘The international monetary system: diffusion and ambiguity’, International Affairs 84: 3, May 2008, p. 455. 20 Enabling them ‘to act freely, insulated from outside pressure’: Cohen, ‘The international monetary system’, p. 455. 21 I follow here Cohen’s distinction between power as autonomy and power as influence. See Benjamin J. Cohen, ‘The macrofoundations of monetary power’, in David M. Andrews, ed., International monetary power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 31–50. Paola Subacchi 490 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs however, is not so very great: China’s economy now accounts for about 5 per cent of the world economy in contrast to about 3 per cent in 1980. Another point worth mentioning here is the ‘perception’ of China’s influence as opposed to the reality. China has captured so much attention among policy-makers and business interests around the world that it is perceived to be more influential —in the sense of having the power to persuade or coerce other countries to defer to its agenda in matters of foreign or regional policy—than it is in reality. Again, this ‘potential influence’ is totally unrelated to the current size of the economy, but is linked to the speed of its development and to its capacity to generate about $20–30 billion per month in trade surplus and foreign direct investment inflows. This in turn allows China to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, invest abroad and supply foreign aid, eventually amassing more influence in economic affairs. This brings up the role played by capital flows, and hence capital accumulation, in developing economies as the distinctive feature of today’s economic order— and what makes it different from other times of rapid economic development, such as the 1960s. Capital in itself is not the source of power—or, at least, not the only one22—but it is the key factor in addressing the issue of power relations in today’s economic order. In other words, capital explains how power—as capacity for action—is deployed and, most of all, how it is used to engage other actors.23 Behind the emergence of new ‘powers’ lies not only the mere size of their economies and the extent of their activities, nor merely their projected GDP growth, but also the large accumulation of capital and the capacity they have to deploy it beyond their borders. Capital also lies at the centre of a theoretical framework that embraces the complexity of today’s economic relations by addressing the issue of how poles relate to each other. Unlike the centre–periphery model, where capital flowed from the centre to the periphery, the multipolar structure is organized through a network of flows in which non-state actors are prominent alongside nation-states. It is therefore necessary to move beyond the nation-state as the fundamental unit of analysis, and to address the issue of how a transnational market economy interacts with a system of competing state and non-state actors.24 Today’s economic order can be seen as a multipolar structure in which certain poles have the power to control significant capital flows.25 Capital flows across this structure, linking each pole to others through a complex network of relations that facilitates the circulation of resources for the production and/or purchase of 22 Restricting the source of power to capital would narrow the concept too far, ignoring many other sources of power in the world economy such as industrial capacity, technology and natural resources. It would also ignore the fact that many countries—e.g. Kuwait, the UAE—have accumulated large sums of money, but are hardly considered great powers. 23 Not necessarily in a coercive relation. 24 See Robert Gilpin, The political economy of international relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 11; Immanuel Wallerstein, The capitalist world economy (Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press/Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1979), p. 273; Geoffrey Underhill, ‘Conceptualizing the changing global order’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, Political economy and the changing global order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 21. 25 This contrasts with the distribution of military power, which remains largely unipolar. On this see Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft power’, Foreign Policy 80, Fall 1990, pp. 153–71. New power centres and new power brokers 491 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs goods, services and commodities. Within this structure power is diffuse rather than equally distributed among the poles. This leaves open the question of what the poles of this structure are and how they are related to each other. In the next sections I focus on the new poles (or power centres) and power relations (involving power brokers). Power centres … The debate on shifting economic power has enjoyed rapid popularization to the point of becoming a cliché because of the ‘China factor’.26 China is now the hub economy for a wide range of Asian countries, has interests and trading relationships across several countries and is a well-recognized factor of transformation in the world economy, with an impact felt in the realms of politics and foreign policy. In the ‘shift of power’ narrative, the ‘China story’ has been extended, in an intuitive rather than analytical way, to countries that share some of China’s features: a large population, strong economic expansion and integration in the world economy, the ability or potential to generate large capital surpluses and increasing influence over international relations. Following a widely publicized piece of research produced by the US bank Goldman Sachs in 2003,27 acronyms have been created to identify large emerging economies that are projected to expand substantially over the next three to five decades, achieving much higher levels of income.28 It is important to stress that in this debate potential plays a much bigger role than reality. In other words, current strong economic performance, coupled with population size, is used as a basis from which to extrapolate future economic and political trends. On the basis of the latter power and influence are inferred. While China’s growing strength is a reality, for many other countries this is not yet the case. It is therefore of critical importance to assess which countries offer a combination of potential and reality, rather than just the potential to develop into great powers. On the basis of current economic indicators—rather than extrapolations— India, Brazil and Russia, along with China, are the most dynamic elements of the world’s economy. Since the early 1990s they have become more open and better integrated. Their share of global exports has risen from just over 4 per cent in 1990 to almost 15 per cent in 2006, and their share of total imports has risen from just below 3 per cent to almost 10 per cent over the same period. Their economies have grown strongly since the early 1990s, with the result that they now are among the world’s ten biggest,29 the others being the United States, Japan, Germany, 26 On this, see Bill Emmott, ‘New policy of a new Asia’, China Economic Quarterly 12: 1, March 2008, p. 17. 27 Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2050’, Goldman Sachs Global Economic Paper No 99, 2003, reprinted in The world and the BRICs dream (New York: Goldman Sachs Group, 2006), pp. 21–35. 28 The two most widely used are BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico). 29 China, India and Brazil were among the ten biggest economies, in terms of both purchasing power parity (PPP) and current prices, at the end of 2005. Only for Russia is there quite a large discrepancy between the size of its economy as measured in PPP terms and its size measured in current prices. In the first case Russia’s ranking was 10, in the latter only 17. However, given the size of Russia’s capital accumulation and its role in foreign policy it may be justifiably considered alongside the other three.#p#分页标题#e# Paola Subacchi 492 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs France, Italy and the UK—in other words, the G7 with the exception of Canada. Their joint share of the world’s economy makes them the second largest ‘bloc’ after the G7.30 However, the gap between the two ‘blocs’ is still large, with the G7 representing just over 50 per cent of the world’s economy.31 The potential for expansion is huge, provided that the right conditions continue to apply. These countries, and in particular China and Russia, control a large pool of surplus capital, a factor that capital deficit countries such as the United States have to take into account. Altogether these countries hold almost half of the world’s foreign exchange reserves.32 China holds by far the largest proportion of this, with approximately $1.5 trillion, followed by Russia, India and Brazil in that order. The central bank of Russia has recently been buying up around $50 billion per quarter in foreign reserves. Russia’s official reserves are now around $500 billion—the third largest holding in the world. Even Brazil, which was on the edge of default as a global debtor between 1999 and 2002, is now a net international creditor, with $190 billion of foreign reserves boosted by high levels of investment and strong prices for commodity exports. All these countries’ current accounts are in surplus, reflecting their economies’ position in the global supply chain as exporters of both manufactured goods and commodities. With the exception of India,33 all current account surpluses in 2007 ranged from around 10 per cent of GDP for China to some 6–6.5 per cent for Russia and just 0.25 per cent for Brazil. Even more important is the capacity of China and Russia to generate a combined surplus in excess of $3 billion every month. This contributes to the accelerating outflow of foreign direct investment from these countries, so that they are now not only major destinations for foreign direct investment—China in particular—but are expanding their own global presence. China has experienced an annual FDI inflow of around $50 billion for many years, rising to over $80 billion in 2006–2007. However, FDI outflows are now up to $15 billion–20 billion from around $2 billion in 2004. In Russia both inflows and outflows of FDI were over $40 billion in 2007, up from as little as $3 billion in 2000. In both India and Brazil inflows and outflows are in the range $20 billion–30 billion. Figures are still modest, but, again, future trends look promising. The reason why China, India, Brazil and Russia have emerged as the new poles in the multipolar economic system, alongside the United States (the old centre) and Europe34 and Japan (the old periphery), is not just because of the size of their economies, with huge potential for strong growth and capital accumulation. These are countries with the potential to influence international relations. They have a wide range of military and political resources; some capacity to shape the international order, regionally or globally; some degree of internal cohesion and capacity for state action; a belief in their entitlement to a more influential role in 30 Here the difference between measuring share of global GDP in PPP terms and measuring it in current prices is very large. In PPP terms, these countries’ share of the world economy is about one-quarter, while in current prices it is just below 10 per cent. 31 This is in PPP terms. At current prices the G7 share is even higher, at about 70 per cent. 32 Japan holds most of the rest with $1 trillion dollars (IMF figures, March 2008). 33 In 2007 India had a small deficit of approximately 1–1.5% of GDP. 34 Here I deliberately avoid defining Europe in less ambiguous terms. New power centres and new power brokers 493 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs world affairs; and the ability to differentiate themselves from other second-tier states.35 … and power 电源 brokers The economic order is shaped and influenced not only by nation-states but also by players that have a capacity for action that goes beyond formal interstate relations, but lack any control over military resources and any capacity for state action. These players hold a considerable amount of capital which they deploy to engage other actors. For the purpose of this article I will call them ‘power brokers’ so as to differentiate them clearly from the ‘power centres’, which are nation-states. This is more than a semantic distinction and encompasses how power brokers fit into the multipolar structure. Because of their institutional settings, the way they operate and the fact that they are usually regulated by and under the power of national states or supranational bodies, they cannot be regarded as ‘free-standing’ poles in the multipolar structure, but should be seen rather as intermediaries of interstate and interinstitutional relations; hence the expression ‘power brokers’.36 Power brokers are sources, users and intermediaries of capital.37 Examples include pension funds, hedge funds, central banks with large foreign exchange reserve holdings, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Their activities and power are geographically dispersed and typically exercised across borders, and their influence and modus operandi are embedded in the market economy rather than in traditional politics. They are often in vigorous competition with each other, and find it difficult to work together for common aims on a sustained basis without the strong encouragement and usually the coercive power of government. They can sometimes become the instruments of effective national policy; they can rarely if ever exercise sustained leverage on their own.38 Some of them—state-owned transnational companies or state-owned investment funds—emanate from state actors. Structural factors, similar to those that have driven the emergence of the new poles discussed above, have fuelled the growth of power brokers that operate in the international markets, often through cross-border relations and transactions. One example of these is SWFs, which have recently gained prominence despite not being a total novelty, especially in countries rich in natural resources and with large balance of payments surpluses. SWFs already manage assets in excess of $2 trillion, and their assets are projected to grow to over $5 trillion by 2015.39 Some of the 35 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?’, International Affairs 82: 1, Jan. 2006, pp. 1–3. See also Hanns W. Maull, ‘Europe and the new balance of global order’, International Affairs 81: 4, July 2005, p. 781. 36 I draw this expression from a report published by McKinsey Global Institute, The new power brokers: how oil, Asia, hedge funds, and private equity are shaping global capital markets (San Francisco, CA: McKinsey, 2007). 37 McKinsey, The new power brokers, p. 10. 38 Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order’, pp. 1–3. 39 Jen Stephen, ‘How big could sovereign wealth funds be by 2015?’, briefing note, Morgan Stanley Global Research, London, 3 March 2007. Paola Subacchi 494 International Affairs 84: 3, 2008 . 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation . 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs largest SWFs belong to the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf region.40 The size of the economies behind these funds and their ability to influence international relations are not enough to justify the inclusion of the Gulf states among the new power centres. However, looking at their SWFs as their power brokers brings them into the analysis and recognizes their increasingly significant impact on the global economic order. Which future? Market autonomy v. state autonomy 它的未来？市场自主诉国家自主性 Economic systems do not exist in a vacuum, but are a reflection of existing institutional and political arrangements. The poles in the multipolar economic system include not only large economies but also political actors with the ambition and the ability to influence the international order. The key question, therefore, is not how much bigger India’s economy can be or how many more billions of dollars in foreign reserves China can accumulate, but whether the future, in which these countries are likely to play a significant role, is one of stability or instability— domestic as well as international. Will the rise of these new powers disrupt existing economic and social arrangements? And what are the economic and foreign policy options for the new poles in an international economic system where the distribution of power and influence remains unbalanced? Will the relationship between rising poles—mostly in Asia—and old poles undergo a process of fundamental structural change that has an impact on the multilateral system in general?41 In its popularized formulation the ‘shift of power’ story identifies global policy areas where enhanced competition may trigger conflicts or tensions between old and new poles.42 This approach rests on two implicit assumptions: that there is an intimate connection between power and wealth and that the state enjoys primacy in political life. From this perspective the state is prior to the market and market relations are shaped by political power. |
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