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Why the pay of Executives are inappropriate关于高管薪酬的讨论一直是一个有争议的话题。
高管是企业的管理者，在很大程度上可以从公司的发展中受益。高管薪酬从一家公司到另一家公司各不相同，但基本薪酬原则可能在很大程度上类似。许多人认为高管的薪酬是不适当的，从长远来看，这可能会损害公司的发展。原因可以解释如下。
There is a heated discussion on the executive pay, which has been a controversial topic for years.
The executives are the managers of the corporations, who can benefit from the development of the company to a great degree. The executive compensation is various from one firm to another, but the basic pay principle may be similar to a large extent. Many people consider the pay of the executives as inappropriate, which can cause damage to the progression of the corporation in the long run. The reasons can be explained a follows.
首先，公司的管理系统总是在不考虑高管绩效的情况下奖励高管奖金（Murphy，1999年）。这一制度不公平，也不会有助于公司的长期快速发展（Samwick，1999年）。当高管表现不佳时，他们也能获得可观的薪酬，这对其他普通员工和公司都不公平。当公司无法盈利时，该系统会在正常运营中导致严重问题，并最终导致公司破产（Bertrand，2001年）。
Firstly, the managing system in a company always rewards the executive bonuses without regarding the performance of them(Murphy, 1999). This system is not fair and will not contribute to the quick development of the firm in the long term(Samwick, 1999). When the executive does not perform themselves well, they can gain considerable pay as well, which is not fair to the other common employees and the corporation. When the company is not profitable, this system can lead to serious problems in the normal operation and may also cause the corporation go to bankruptcyin the end(Bertrand, 2001).
其次，高管的薪酬要比企业领导层底层的员工高很多。例如，在美国，高管和公司最底层员工的薪酬比例已经上升到400比1，这在普通员工中引起了愤怒。此外，这种高比率在其他国家也很普遍（Garvey，2003年）。然而，在越来越多的情况下，高管的业绩不能满足公司的发展，这可以看作是一种不作为（Murphy，1999）。近年来，许多大公司都出现了这个问题，这也不会给世界经济带来好处。这是对高管薪酬不当的另一种解释。
Secondly, the pay of the executives is quite higher than the employees at the bottom of the corporate leader. For instance, the ratio between the pay of the executives and those at the bottom of the firm ladder has increased to 400-to-1 in the United States, which has caused anger among the common employees. Moreover, this type of high ratio is prevalent in other countries as well(Garvey, 2003). However, in more and more cases, the performance of the executives can not meet the development of the corporation, which can be seen as a kind of nonfeasance(Murphy, 1999). This issue has been represented in many large companies in recent years, which will not benefit the world economy as well. This is another one explanation on the inappropriateof the executive pay.
第三，关注激励结构，激励结构可以在短时间内促进高管完成目标。当短期目标实现时，高管的奖金会很高，或者薪酬会相对较低（Samwick，1999年）。这样，高管们将不遗余力地追求目标，但这种结构也可能从长远来看损害公司的利益，如公司的福利、股东的利润和社会的普遍福利。在大萧条时期，大多数人开始指责金融业的这种行为。激励结构可以激励高管实现目标，但这也不适合公司长远发展（Girma，2007年）。
Thirdly, it is a concern on the incentives structures which can promote the executives to complete the goals during a short period of time. When the short-term goal is realized, the bonuses of the executives will be high, or the compensation will be comparatively lower(Samwick, 1999). In this way, the executives will spare no effort to pursue the aim, but this structure may also harm the company in the long run, such as the well-being of the firms, the shareholders’ profits and the general welfare in the society. Most people begin to blame such behaviors in the financial industry during the Great Recession. The incentives structures may motivate the executives to realize the goals, but this means is also not proper for the development of the company in the long run(Girma, 2007).
综上所述，说明适当的高管薪酬的原因可能是多种多样的，公司对高管的监管制度也不太明确，不利于公司在世界经济和各行业日益激烈的竞争中健康、快速的发展，以期继续为了公司的顺利发展，管理者要在公司里表现良好，带领公司朝着繁荣的方向发展。In conclusion, the reasons for illustrating theinappropriate executive compensation can be diverse, and the companies systems in regulating the executives are not so definite, which is adverse to the sound and quick development of the corporations in theincreasingly fierce completions in the world economy and in various industries.In order to contribute to the smooth development of the company, the executives should behave themselves well in the firm and lead the company to develop in a prosperous direction.
Reference
Bertrand, M, 2001, Are CEO’s rewarded for luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.901-932.
Garvey, G, 2003, Incentive Compensation when executives can hedge the market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section, Journal of Finance, vol. 58, no. 4, pp.1557-1581.
Girma, S., 2007, Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence from the UK, The Manchester School, vol. 75, no. 1, pp.65–81.
Murphy, K., 1999, Executive Compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics, vol.3. pp.2485-2563.
Samwick, A., 1999, The Other Side if the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107 no. 5, pp.65-104.
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