浅析我国农村信用社的改革对策
Overall RCC reform
开发管理能力Developing management capabilities
Depending on the direction that the RCC network takes in the future, two broad recommendations emerge. First, 首先,农村信用社可以转化为小而股份制单一单位的银行,在现有的商业银行法的框架下,相关的治理问题,需要加以解决。
RCCs could be transformed into small, joint-stock single-unit banks, probably with much-reduced minimum capital and other licensing requirements; the related governance issues would need to be addressed in the framework of the existing commercial banking law. A second possibility is that the RCCs develop as genuine cooperative banks. To that end, an internal management structure with apex organizations at different levels would need to be developed for management support, training, audit and supervision. http://www.ukassignment.org/dxessay/
For the second course of action, it is imperative that the demand for apex-level structures should be mobilized from, and driven by, the primary level RCCs. Otherwise, a supply-driven institution-building approach will too easily appear, with limited efficiency and expensive recurrent cost implications for the RCC network. The latter alternative must be avoided at all costs.
专门的法律框架是什么 Specialized legal framework?
It is uncertain whether RCCs will emerge as thrift-and-credit cooperatives, cooperative banks or single-unit joint-stock banks. For the last-named option, no specialized legislation would be required as joint-stock banks are fully and entirely covered by national banking legislation. For the first two - cooperative - options, those carrying out reforms should draw upon the expertise of leading modern cooperative associations with extensive experience in legal matters, such as the Raffeisen Foundation in Germany. Desjardins International Development is another source of detailed knowledge in facilitating microcredit operations.
储蓄为主的发展模型Savings-based development approach
Deposit instruments need to maintain their current range of term diversification and pricing. RCCs have had a higher proportion of deposits from households and a higher proportion of time deposits. Moreover, the proportion of time deposit to household deposits was around 70% compared with 55% for ABC. Compulsory deposit insurance available to rural depositors in RCCs and ABC instead of a de facto state guarantee for state-owned financial institutions would diversify risks and increase the robustness of the financial system.
贷款重组的透明度Transparency of loan rescheduling
Tracking down rescheduled loans in a bank's portfolio is neither an impossible nor a mysterious undertaking. However, the statement of accounts on which the accounting frame is based needs to be updated. In the 'Loan Assets' heading of the accounts, a separate item for rescheduled loans needs to be added. If loans are rescheduled with different maturities sub-accounts should be inserted, classified by repayment period. To achieve consistency, development projects should avoid putting rescheduling routines in their credit manuals; instead, they should promote adequate loan loss provisions for treating rescheduled past-due loans.
The banking skills of RCC staff need upgrading to a level that will allow for sound financial and elementary technical screening of loan applications. The recent trend to separate policy-based lending from commercial lending is a welcome step. In the longer run, the rural finance system requires a level playing field between the different institutions and the phasing-out of preferential and subsidized lending to priority target groups.
Complementarities at the client level should be pursued to avoid an imbalance between loans and technical services through state extension and support services or through innovative ways of promoting small enterprise development. For non-credit financial services, insurance schemes and loan and deposit services have been introduced and are on offer through the Animal Husbandry Bureau for livestock insurance. These would broaden the scope of financial services and encourage a shift from a credit-based approach to a broader service approach.
Improved mechanisms to facilitate learning
There is no harm in not having it right the first time an activity is undertaken, but there is a need for a structured process to be put in place for drawing relevant lessons from past experience and incorporating them into future activities. The onus is on donors to put in place more objective and transparent monitoring and evaluation systems and to make results available to other agencies planning to replicate a service delivery approach. Once this system is in place, the debate will be greatly facilitated. The pros and cons will clearly emerge for the government-staffed parallel financial intermediation structures set up by a number of microfinance projects. Their performance and prospects need to be compared with those of the RCCs that operate within the existing framework of rural financial institutions. Such a broader comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this study. It is, however, recommended that the donor community follow up with a broader, possibly jointly launched, evaluation of rural finance and microfinance approaches in China. Involvement of the different government ministries and agencies would be imperative. Such an objective performance assessment could then guide future decisions regarding support to financial systems.
Despite its imperfections, microfinance is still a key element in poverty eradication policies. No one approach can be applied uniformly across all regions of China. In some areas, where no local financial infrastructure exists in the form of RCCs, the PMO model may still be a valid option. In the Chinese context, the limitation of IFAD's loan instrument becomes apparent in mainstreaming IFAD project funds into the local financial infrastructure. It uses only the loan instrument, and volume is small compared with other major IFIs. Using its own resources and instruments, IFAD may not be able to negotiate reform of RCCs, which would be part of the overall financial sector reforms, as well as public sector reform. Issues can be addressed by encouraging RCCs to experiment and by creating a system of rewards and sanctions. The pilot experiments assisted by IFAD ought to be jointly evaluated for replication. This would serve and assist all Chinese partner institutions in learning and reassessing policy.
In China, the system of resource transfer from the central to local governments is unique, with two distinct features. 首先,农发基金的资金为贷款转移到乡镇一级和乡镇地方,政府负责偿还。First, IFAD funds are transferred as loans through to the township level, and the township local government is responsible for repayment. In most other countries, IFAD loans either flow as grant funds from the central government or as loan funds only to the level of provincial government. The foreign exchange risk always remains with the central government. The townships receive IFAD loan funds as grants. 第二,省,地,县,乡政府负责动员必要的配套资金。在大多数其他国家中,配套资金由中央财政由省级政府提供。Second, the provincial, prefecture, county and township governments are responsible for mobilizing the necessary counterpart funds. In most other countries, counterpart funds are provided either by the central government or by the provincial government.
The present system in China for transfers of loans needs to be changed. If funds reach the county and township level as 'loan funds' to be repaid, it is too optimistic to assume that the local governments will hand over funds for the credit component to RCCs. Local governments prefer to retain firm control in their final allocation, since they themselves ultimately have to pay them back. At the same time, funding under projects for rural infrastructure, training and extension services needs to reach the township government as 'grants.' Credit funds should be made available to the RCCs as loans. Funding for capacity building and infrastructure to improve RCC outreach and client access will have to be provided in grant form. Following the theory of 'seeing is believing,' it would be appropriate to organize a study to permit policy-makers in China to study and understand the procedures of IFAD loan use in other countries.#p#分页标题#e#
It is not easy to understand why MOF has one set of regulations for IFAD funds and another set for other IFIs. IFAD funds are transferred to provinces at 4.5% and the provinces have to bear all the risks. In contrast, World Bank funds are transferred to provinces at 2%, or at considerably lower rates. Such disparities need to be minimized. If arrangements similar to those of the World Bank are established, provinces will be able to lend to RCCs at an acceptable interest rate. RCCs, under the IFAD project framework, borrow from the county or township, but it would be appropriate for RCCs to borrow directly from the provinces to avoid co-ownership of funds at the local level. Participants in the above-mentioned Technical Review Workshop also recommended that credit funds be transferred directly from the provinces to RCCs.
|