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高管薪酬有着激烈的讨论，这是多年来一直是一个有争议的话题。
高管人员是公司的管理者，谁能在很大程度上受益于公司的发展。许多人认为高管的薪酬是不恰当的，这可能会对公司的发展造成损害，从长远来看。原因可以解释如下。
首先，管理系统在公司总是奖励高管的奖金没有关于它们的性能（Murphy，1999）。这一制度是不公平的，也不利于在长期内企业的快速发展（Samwick，1999）。当执行官表现不好时，他们也可以获得可观的报酬，这对其他普通员工和公司是不公平的。当公司不盈利，这个系统能够正常运行的严重问题，也可能导致公司去破产结束（贝特朗，2001）。
There is a heated discussion on the executive pay, which has been a controversial topic for years.
The executives are the managers of the corporations, who can benefit from the development of the company to a great degree. The executive compensation is various from one firm to another, but the basic pay principle may be similar to a large extent. Many people consider the pay of the executives as inappropriate, which can cause damage to the progression of the corporation in the long run. The reasons can be explained a follows.
Firstly, the managing system in a company always rewards the executive bonuses without regarding the performance of them(Murphy, 1999). This system is not fair and will not contribute to the quick development of the firm in the long term(Samwick, 1999). When the executive does not perform themselves well, they can gain considerable pay as well, which is not fair to the other common employees and the corporation. When the company is not profitable, this system can lead to serious problems in the normal operation and may also cause the corporation go to bankruptcyin the end(Bertrand, 2001).
Secondly, the pay of the executives is quite higher than the employees at the bottom of the corporate leader. For instance, the ratio between the pay of the executives and those at the bottom of the firm ladder has increased to 400-to-1 in the United States, which has caused anger among the common employees. Moreover, this type of high ratio is prevalent in other countries as well(Garvey, 2003). However, in more and more cases, the performance of the executives can not meet the development of the corporation, which can be seen as a kind of nonfeasance(Murphy, 1999). This issue has been represented in many large companies in recent years, which will not benefit the world economy as well. This is another one explanation on the inappropriateof the executive pay.
Thirdly, it is a concern on the incentives structures which can promote the executives to complete the goals during a short period of time. When the short-term goal is realized, the bonuses of the executives will be high, or the compensation will be comparatively lower(Samwick, 1999). In this way, the executives will spare no effort to pursue the aim, but this structure may also harm the company in the long run, such as the well-being of the firms, the shareholders’ profits and the general welfare in the society. Most people begin to blame such behaviors in the financial industry during the Great Recession. The incentives structures may motivate the executives to realize the goals, but this means is also not proper for the development of the company in the long run(Girma, 2007).
In conclusion, the reasons for illustrating theinappropriate executive compensation can be diverse, and the companies systems in regulating the executives are not so definite, which is adverse to the sound and quick development of the corporations in theincreasingly fierce completions in the world economy and in various industries.In order to contribute to the smooth development of the company, the executives should behave themselves well in the firm and lead the company to develop in a prosperous direction.
Reference文献
Bertrand, M, 2001, Are CEO’s rewarded for luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.901-932.
Garvey, G, 2003, Incentive Compensation when executives can hedge the market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section, Journal of Finance, vol. 58, no. 4, pp.1557-1581.
Girma, S., 2007, Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence from the UK, The Manchester School, vol. 75, no. 1, pp.65–81.
Murphy, K., 1999, Executive Compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics, vol.3. pp.2485-2563.
Samwick, A., 1999, The Other Side if the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107 no. 5, pp.65-104.
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