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Hume’s Ethics
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Hume’s ethics as an emotive theory of ethics
3. Conclusion
4. Bibliography
大卫•休谟是一位杰出的苏格兰哲学家的观点的18th世纪有明显的影响了一代又一代的思想家之后整个世界。他争论关于诱导持怀疑态度,尤其是宗教原因,包括他的著名命题,只有从人类知识产生感性经验,不是出于理性判断,形成了19th经验和20th世纪哲学。他最著名的说法“原因是情感的奴隶”,这是一个基石,在很大程度上解释了他的道德观点表情角色他的道德。
休谟的伦理学作为一个敏感的理论的道德
在他的作品中,大卫•休谟极大的关注伦理和道德的问题,他想要讨论这些问题,提出了自己的见解。在这方面它值得提到他基本上描绘了道德理论的论述》第三册,题为“道德的”。作者主要论述了他的道德原则问题是否是从道德差别的原因。把它更准确的大卫•休谟探讨可能存在的问题,关于是否批准是人类道德理性的批判的关于概念关系和事实或者情绪化的反应。在分析这种两难局面,休谟提前到达认为它是相当情绪化的反应,已经很少,如果有,共同的理由。此外,有必要强调在她的T.Z. Lavine讨论休谟哲学指出,根据他“原因提供工具、仪器或装置,为获取什么激情的愿望”(1984:180)。
摘要休谟是很挑剔的一般关系到他的对手他们的道德理论为基础的道德理性帐户。例如,休谟的批判,提出了若干观点-克拉克和撒母耳对他的理性的观点,其中最著名的是一个争论从树上parricide:“一个年轻的树,并杀死overgrows其母展现了相同的所谓关系看成是一个人类小孩杀害了他的父母,如果道德问题的关系时,比年轻的树是不道德的,这是荒谬的”(Frankl 1985:233)。
此外,休谟同样认为道德评估经验事实不是判断。哲学家声称他们不可能找到了一个事实,那就是可以被称为不道德行为对任何不道德的审查。换句话说,休谟站在地上,那是不可能的演绎陈述的责任从报表的事实。因此,作为一种道德上的判断是不批准的理由,休谟认为,它必须是一个情绪反应。把它更精确,一个观众道德批准是一种喜悦,不能经历的时候,考虑一个特工的品质,而且,这种快乐产生额外的爱的感受或傲慢在旁观者》(Frankl 1985:247)。
摘要休谟是很挑剔的显然是什么原因。例如,他否认有重要作用的原因在激励或反对行为,它只是一种计算器的概念和经验。他认为真正重要的是人们觉得自己的行为。以这样一种方式显而易见,休谟的工具主义倾向,一个动作或状态是合理的伦理观念,当且仅当它是代理商的目标和愿望,不管他们是。据他说,原因可以进入图片仅作为一个马屁精,告知代理人有用的事实论为他的行为的目标和愿望,但“从未deigning告诉代理,他应该有目标和渴望”(Frankl 1985:261)。#p#分页标题#e#指导英国伦理学assignment
与此同时,有必要指出,在道德和伦理的语境中这样的观点激进休谟并非如此激进的,因为它可能是。事实上,哲学家认为不道德的行为是不道德的,因为它是不反对的理由。他第一次声称“道德信仰在本质上是动力——如果你相信造成错误的东西,你将事实上不杀生,激发批评杀死等等”(Frankl 1985:295)。然而,他提醒,原因就可以激发没有发现的事实问题——原因和逻辑,它取决于个人的欲望和偏好。因此,故无法独自激励道德信仰。另一方面休谟并不绝对否认理性的作用,因为它的影响下的作品虽然人类情感和欲望。
David Hume is an outstanding Scottish philosopher of the 18th century whose views has a significant impact on the following generations of thinkers throughout the world. His sceptical arguments concerning induction, causation and especially religion, including his famous thesis that human knowledge arises only from sense experience and not from rational judgments, shaped the 19th and 20th century empiricist philosophy. His famous saying that ‘reason is the slave of the passions’ is a cornerstone of his ethical views largely explains the emotive character of his ethics.
Hume’s ethics as an emotive theory of ethics
In his works David Hume paid a lot of attention to ethical and moral problems he wanted to discuss these issues and presented his own particular views. At this respect it is worth to mention his moral theory basically depicted in Book 3 of the Treatise, titled “Of Morals”. The author basically discusses the principle issue of his ethics whether moral distinctions are derived from reason. To put it more precisely David Hume discusses the question concerning whether human moral approval is a rational judgment about conceptual relations and facts or an emotional response. On analysing such a dilemma, Hume arrives to the conclusion that it is rather an emotional response that has little, if has any at all, in common with reason. Moreover, it is necessary to underline that T.Z. Lavine in her discussion of Hume’s philosophy points out that according to him “reason provides the means, the instruments or devices, for gaining what the passions desire” (1984:180).
In general Hume is very critical in relation to his opponents who based their ethic theories on rationalistic account of morality. For instance, Hume’s criticises Samuel Clarke and presents several arguments against his rationalistic views, the most famous of which is an argument from arboreal parricide: “a young tree that overgrows and kills its parent exhibits the same alleged relations as a human child killing his parent; if morality is a question of relations, than the young tree is immoral, which is absurd” (Frankl 1985:233).
Furthermore, Hume also argues that moral assessments are not judgments about empirical facts. The philosopher states that it is impossible to find a fact that can be called immoral for any immoral action that is examined. In other words Hume stands on the ground that it is impossible to deduce statements of obligation from statements of facts. Consequently, as moral approval is not judgment of reason, Hume concludes that it must be an emotional response. To put it more precisely, a spectator moral approval is a type of pleasure that cannot be experienced when considering an agent’s qualities, moreover, this pleasure “produces additional feelings of love or pride within the spectator” (Frankl 1985:247).#p#分页标题#e#http://www.ukassignment.org/daixieAssignment/daixieyingguoassignment/2011/1110/19157.html
Obviously Hume is very critical about the reason. For instance, he denies that reason has any important role in motivating or discouraging behavior, it is just a sort of calculator of concept and experience. What he believes is really important is what people feel about the behavior. In such a way it becomes obvious that Hume tends to instrumentalism, which state that an action or ethical notion is reasonable if and only if it serves the agent’s goals and desires, whatever they be. According to him, reason can enter the picture only as a lackey, informing the agent of useful facts concerning which actions will serve his goals and desires, but “never deigning to tell the agents which goals and desires he should have” (Frankl 1985:261).
At the same time, it is necessary to point out that in moral and ethical context such radicalism in Hume’s views is not so radical as it might seem to be. In fact the philosopher argues that immoral behavior is not immoral because it is against reason. He first claims that “moral beliefs are intrinsically motivated – if you believe killing is wrong, you will be ipso facto motivated not to kill and to criticise killing and so on” (Frankl 1985:295). However, he reminds that the reason alone can motivate nothing – reason discovers matters of fact and logic, and it depends on individual’s desires and preferences. Consequently, reason alone cannot motivate moral beliefs. On the other hand Hume does not absolutely deny the role of reason since it works though under the influence of human emotions and desires.
Furthermore, Hume advanced the idea that the explanation of moral principles is to be sought in the utility they tend to promote. At this respect it is quite noteworthy to mention that Hume argues that moral spectators approve of benevolence and benevolence is approved of because it has utility.
At the same time, it should be said that Hume’s ethic theory is not deprived of some controversial points. For instance, attempting to determine whether an agent’s motivating character trait is natural or artificial, he decides this one virtue at a time. For him, the natural virtues include benevolence, meekness, charity and generosity. By contrast, the artificial virtues include justice, keeping promises, allegiance and chastity. Paradoxically in fact, Hume classes the key virtues that are necessary for well-ordered state as artificial, and he classes only the more supererogatory virtues as natural.
Conclusion
Thus, taking into account all above mentioned, it is possible to conclude that Hume’s ethical views are based on denying the role of reason and exaggerating the role of human emotions, desires and preferences. At the same time his moral and ethical theory is to a certain extent controversial and often justly criticised. In fact he is not very persuasive mainly because his argument against moral rationalists seems to confuse questions of moral epistemology with questions of moral motivation. Hume can hardly be right to claim that from the fact that one is not motivated to do the right thing, it follows that one cannot understand what the right thing to do is. Finally his efforts to explain how moral distinctions arise from human passions seem to invoke the very kind of substantive, non-instrumental reasoning which he denies in his works.#p#分页标题#e#
Bibliography:
1. Lavine, T. Z. (1984). From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest. New York: Bantam Books.
2. Frankl, Victor E. (1985). Man's Search for Meaning. New York: Washington Square Press.
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