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at the same time asthe literature of financials is replete in regardss to the “theory of the firm,”the fabric sometimessubsumed under that heading isn't actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets by which firms are vitalactors. The firm is a “black box” operated so that you can meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. with the exception of a couple of new and tentative steps, however, we don't have any theory and is the reason how the conflicting objectives of the person participants are brought into equilibrium so that you can yield this result. the restrictions of this black box view of the firm were cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. newerly, popular debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of householdership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature at the “theory of the firm” have evidenced proceedingfearwith these issues.
虽然经济学的文献中充斥着“企业理论的引用，”的材料一般归入该标题是不是实际上是一个企业理论，而是理论的市场中，企业是重要的参与者。该公司是一个“黑箱”操作，以满足相关的投入和产出的边际条件，从而实现利润最大化，或者更准确地说，现值。除了最近的一些试探性步骤，但是，我们有没有理论解释如何个别参与者被带入平衡相互冲突的目标，从而产生这样的结果的。这个黑盒子的局限性，鉴于公司已被引用的亚当·斯密和阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔，等等。最近，流行，
专业争论的“社会责任”的企业，所有权和控制权的分离，而且皮疹文学上的“理论”已经证明这些问题的持续关注公司的评论。
An independent stream of researchwith vitalimplications for the idea of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others.fiveA comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). at the same time asthe point of interemainder of this research has been “property rights”,6 the subject material encompassed is much broader than that term suggests. what's very vitalfor the issues addressed here's that particularation of personrights determines how costs and rewards shall be allocated some of the participants in any organization. because the preciseation of rights is in general affected through contracting (implicit in addition to explicit), personbehavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depfinally end upat the personalityof those contracts. We deal with this paper at the behavioral implications of the right kindty rights specified within the contracts between the landlords and bosses of the firm.
一个独立的流研究与企业理论的重要影响已经刺激科斯的开创性工作，并延长阿尔钦，德姆塞茨，等等问题给出一个全面的调查，这种文学由菲吕博滕Pejovich（1972） 。虽然这项研究的重点一直是“产权”，6题材涵盖范围远远超过，顾名思义。什么是很重要的问题在这里解决，规范个人权利决定如何将分配给任何组织的参与者的成本和回报。由于该规范的权利一般是通过承包（隐式和显式）的影响，个人行为的组织，包括管理人员的行为，将取决于这些合同的性质。我们专注在本文中，该公司的所有者和管理者之间的合同中指定的产权对行为的影响。
We define an agency relationship as a freelance under which a number of persons (the principal(s)) engage someone else (the agent) to accomplish a fewservice at their bepartwhich involves delegating a fewdecision creating authority to the agent. If both parties to the connection are utility maximizers, there's smartreasdirectly to believe thon the agent won't almethodsact within the most productive interests of the principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to restrict the aberrant activities of the agent. as well as in a fewsituations it is going to pay the agent to expfinishresources (bonding costs) to make sure that he's going not to take sureactions which maydamagethe principal or to be sure thon the principal shall be compensated if he does take this type ofctions.
However, it's in general most unlikelyfor the principal or the agent at zero cost to be sure thon the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In maximumagency relationships the principal and the agent will incur suremonitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary in addition to pecuniary), and as well because the re shall be a fewdivergence between the agent’s decisions8 and people decisions which maymaximize the welfare of the principal.
Note alin order gency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative attempt(this type ofs the coauthoring of this paper) by two or more people despite the fact thon there is not any clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed on this gentleit's transparentthat our definition of agency costs and their importance to the idea of the firm bears an in intensityrelationship to the factorof shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise within the ir paper at the idea of the firm.
because the connection between the stockholders and the personagers of an organization fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it's going to return as no wonderto locatethon the'ssues related to the “separation of householdership and control” within the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately related to the overall problem of agency. We displayundern explanation of why and the way the agency costs generated by the company shapeare born ends up in a theory of the landlordship (or capital) structure of the firm.
governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and that in relationships normally classified as agency relationships this type ofs those common within the performing arts and the marketplace for real estate. the developmentof theories to give an explanation for the shape which agency costs absorb each of those situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and the way and why they're born will result in a rich theory of organizations that isn't anyw lacking in economics and the social sciences generally. We confine our attention on this paper to only a small a part of this general problem—the researchof agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the landlords and top controlof the corporation.
the general publicly held business corporation is a wonderfulsocial invention. Millions of people voluntarily entrust billions of greenbacks, francs, pesos, etc. of private wealth to the automobilee of managers at the root of a posh set of contracting relationships which delineate the bests of the parties involved. the expansion within the U.S.e of the company shapein addition to the expansion in market priceof established companiesmeans that no less than, as much because the existing, creditors and that investors have by and largenot been disappointed with the outcomes, despite the agency costs inhehirewithin the corporate form.
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