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With the constant developmentof the regulatory system of commercialbanks , open capital markets , making the town commercial banks entered the ranks of listed companies , corporate governance problems of urban commercial banks , despite the development, but ownership structure is irrational, imperfect, "three will "the thrillctions of general weakening , it's trickyto play a task in decision-making , in order thon the efficiency of governance continues to be not top. Shareholding structure of the corporate , for the progressionof urban commercial bank corporate governance framework , improve the personagement level , and decoratethe core competitiveness of significant significance .
the present serious problems of urban commercial banks exist within the corporate governance structure
over the topconcentration of householdership structure , low operating efficiency tfactorbanks. Local government direct intervention and control of the banking operations . Shareholding structure of a single , unscientific , not just trickyto shapean efficient control mechanism, but in addition reduces the efficiency of the organization running the bank .
the basicresponsibilities and rights don't seem to be transparent, the organization doesn't regulate the operation of the Bank's Board and controlteam, legal representative unclear, untransparentresponsibilities , leading to failure of the bank's internal control mechanism ; a fewcause , chairman and president , chairman of directly operated , President no corresponding authority , or president an excessive amount ofchronic , the los angelesck of restraint of the Board ; shareholders' meeting , the Board of Supervisors and that ineffective internal audit department , didn't play its due role within the supervision and control; controlteam lacking solidarity together , cause internal controlcontrol , decree not smooth , hidden greater risk.
Business conduct short-term , the impact of the rapid progressionof the commercialbanks . Bank controlmarket operators consciousness, loss of long-term business thinking strategies, loss of scientific and that institutionalized decision-making behavior .
Responsibilities and rights body asymmetry, internal imbalance. Banks so as to create a "performance " to endthe deposits and benefittargets government issued , without reference to worth, without reference to the danger of irregular operations set , blind expansion of commercialscale ; so as to hide its operational risks , fraud , creating a major distortion of accounting ; bank loans than approval, no responsibility , poor asset quality, the bank staffeat big pot of very significant issue.
Causes
Shareholding structure is irrational, seriously affected the town commercial banks operating objectives and modus operandi . because the town commercial bank is a made of presidency control, which goes with business objectives and toughsense of presidency action . Local governments out of consideration for the local perspective of monetarydevelopment, urban commercial banks will naturally be asked to enda fewbusiness with the federal government tendentious in its policy steerage, a substantial a part of those business and commercial banking business objectives contrary , whereby the urban commercial bank controlin a dilemma at the conduct of operations will inevitably result briefly-term , in the finishmay have an immediate impact at the survival of the root of towncommercial banks and progressionpotential .
Absence of professionalperty owners , commercial banks is tricky to figure outthe connection between science and checks and balances . Judging from the bank board level , according to "Company Law ", " Commercial Bank Law" Director, Chairman formally elected by the percentageholders' Meeting , if truth be told, are appointed by the local government . they have got no sabsorb full , however the agent of the landlords of capital as opposed to capital owners themselves. because the state to implement multi-sectoral controlof state-owned assets , the los angelesck of state-owned assets charge of allied sectors. towncommercial banks this a particular property rights arrangements , loss of effective property rights and reticence mechanisms , at the same time asthe "three shall be 4powers " it's trickyto offer full play to the role of supervision and controlpurposes, the facilitys of the percentageholders , the board of supervisors and senior controlpersonnel , responsibilities and benefits can't be an efficient checks and balances between the division and to make sure the effective operation of commercialbanks .
Ownership incentive and reticence function isn't to play , operating efficiency isn't high. Rational structure of professionalperty rights can identifyan efficient mechanism for correctty rights , give full play to the thrillction of incentives and constraints , promote commercial bank operating efficiency. Operators of commercialbanks is an independent interest groups , the behavior of the operators incentives and constraints need to be both economic and legal . As conventionalBritish banks formed the executive culture of the executive level and the " official position" of incentives, property agent'schronics , duties and responsibilities is tricky to put. First nominee shareholder interests proactive maintenance responsibility isn't strong. a fewtowncommercial banks operating team isn't liable for the bank itself , however the federal government is responsible , the agent first fearis with the federal government , by the Bank 's actual result of operations . loss of maintenance of the long-term interests of shareholders and the interests of the banks intrinsic motivation . Second, banks don't functionindependently of awarenessand economic interests , the federal government's social goals above the bank's operating efficiency goals . Operators monetary rewards just a small a part of all kinds of repayment, operators are more interested in another promotion and other repaymentthon the chief remuneration within the type of non- quantified . since there's a large flaw distribution mechanism , making long-term incentives fail , therefore, to reinforce the motivations and constraints need torealize the commercialbenefits of monetization and contracts for operators.
Suggestions and countermeasures
Build characteristics of equity structure, to succeed in diversification of householdership structure , ownership structure is reasonablescientific basis for corporate governance , corporate governance and figure outthe operating performance . Given the ever present British towncommercial banks over the topconcentration of householdership structure issues , should build characteristics of the landlordship structure . Therefore, within the construction of towncommercial banks should deal with specialty property considered dispersion of equity, the gradual reduction of state-owned shares , to construct a diversified ownership structure held jointly by the national , institutional investors ( foreign ) , SMEs, industryunions and so forth.
Enrich and adsimplythe percentageholding structure, strengthen property rights and reticence mechanisms . First, the banking system reshapeand that innovation into the right kindty system should first identifyproperty rights and reticence mechanisms, in order that professionalperty play topefficiency. From the town commercial banks to decorateoperational efficiency rights perspective, equity need toimplement structural diversification, decentralization and socialization.
the once a year salary system , making a probanker. Operators of commercialbanks is an independent interest groups , constraints at the behavior of the operators need to be economic and legal . In relation funders and operators , and to reinforce the motivations and constraints need to be implemented and that institutionalized clarity of responsibility and rights , thon the performance of the operators realize the advantages http://www.ukassignment.org/dxygessay/ of monetization and contracts. Should identifyperformance incentives for the operators of the once a year salary system , the pursuit of self-interest maximization operators into the pursuit of maximizing corporate income.
Improve audit oversight system to make sure its safe operation . Sound and effective audit oversight system is the organizatidirectly to make sure effective risk prevention . towncommercial banks so as to reinforce corporate controlsystem as a prerequisite to a comprehensive and effective methods of supervision as an averages to punish the most efficientto audit the audit supervision system security. so as to satisfy the wishes of international monetaryfestival, changing audit work prior to now undeniableverification of the accounts and accounting documents and accounts table card matches the old routine , transfer to 4key content. First, identifyan auditing system procedures , that specialize within the institutionof the Board is liable for oversight of the audit system , the Board authorized the audit of monetarypunishment given transparentrights and responsibilities , in order thon the audit evidence-based supervision , to be sure thon the audit work of the writerity and that independence of oversight . Second, the audit focused at the assessmentof internal control assessmentsystem itself checks to make sure the rational and effective internal control system of towncommercial banks . Third, towncommercial banks , this type ofs the implementation of the interior control system inspection and assessmentof internal control activities . Oversee the implementation of the personagement measures and regulations , to spot problems , plug the toiletpholes , eliminate hidden dangers , guard against and defuse monetaryrisks. The fourth is associated with the audit results and economic interests. Audit departments will punish quantitative signsof content, embedded distribution system , Jiangyoufalie , audit and supervision of the consequences play protection.
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