历史Essay要求：Historical Investigation of Canada’s Failure at the Battle of Dieppe

本文是历史专业的Essay范例，题目是“Historical Investigation of Canada’s Failure at the Battle of Dieppe（加拿大Dieppe战役失败的历史考察）”，这次历史调查的目的是回答这个问题:为什么加拿大在Dieppe战役中失败了?两个来源,我将评估策略和培训燧发枪团的皇家山上,DieppeRaid, 1939 - 1942年由卡洛琳D幻,一个案例研究的燧发枪团的Mont-Royals检验他们的军事训练和条令,回忆和反思1942年8月19日的DieppeRaid John s . Edmonson一名老兵讲述他在Dieppe的经历。对战略和作战失败的分析和Dieppe的战术失败的主要原因，使本调查对加拿大在Dieppe失败的原因进行了全面的概述。

Section One: Identification and Evaluation of Sources第一节:来源的识别和评价

This historical investigation aims to answer the question: why did Canada fail at the Battle of Dieppe? Two sources that I will be evaluating are Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942 by Caroline D’Amours, a case study on the Fusiliers Mont-Royals that examines their military training and doctrine, and Memories and Reflections on the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942 by John S. Edmonson, a war veteran’s account on his experiences at Dieppe. Both an analysis on the strategic and operational failures and a primary account of the tactical failures at Dieppe gives this investigation a holistic overview of why Canada failed at Dieppe.

Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid 1929-1942 is valuable, with reference to its origin, because D’Amours’ educational background and experiences are both rooted in World War Two; with her credentials corroborated by a peer-reviewed journal, Canadian Military History. The article was published seventy-three years after Dieppe, meaning there is less bias given the decreased physical and time-based proximity. With respect to its purpose, the article is valuable because it aims to understand the role of military strategy and operations in the tactical failure of Fusiliers Mont-Royals. The article’s content is also valuable because D’Amours uses a variety of primary historical documents and past scholarly articles as a basis for the case study.

就其起源而言，《燧发枪山》和《1929-1942年Dieppe突袭》中的战术和训练是很有价值的，因为达莫尔的教育背景和经历都植根于第二次世界大战;同行评议期刊《加拿大军事历史》证实了她的资历。这篇文章发表于迪埃普之后73年，这意味着由于物理和时间上的接近度降低，偏见更少。就其目的而言，这篇文章是有价值的，因为它旨在了解军事战略和行动在燧发枪山-皇家队战术失败中的作用。这篇文章的内容也很有价值，因为D 'Amours使用了各种原始历史文献和过去的学术文章作为案例研究的基础。

In relation to its origin, the article is limited since D’Amours predominately Canadian education confines the article to her Canadian perspective. A major limitation, in terms of purpose, is the use of the Fusiliers Mont-Royals as the case of study.  There is no analysis on the failures of other regiments or the successes of enemy regiments, potentially resulting in overlooked sources of failure given the imbalance of perspectives. The source is also limited in its content because it offers minimal insight into the faults of Canada at Dieppe as a whole, given the scope of D’Amours thesis.

关于它的起源，这篇文章是有限的，因为达穆尔主要是加拿大教育限制了文章的加拿大视角。就目的而言，一个主要的限制是使用燧发枪团的皇家山作为研究案例。没有分析其他兵团的失败或敌人兵团的成功，由于视角的不平衡，可能会导致忽视失败的根源。鉴于达穆尔论文的范围，该资料的内容也很有限，因为它提供的关于加拿大Dieppe的整体断层的见解很少。

Memories and Reflections on the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942 is valuable, with reference to its origin, because it is a primary document written by a Canadian war veteran who experienced the Dieppe Raid firsthand as a soldier in South Saskatchewan Regiment. With respect to its purpose, the document is valuable because Edmonson reflects on his experiences at Dieppe, as a memoir and to bring justice to Canadians who lost their lives at Dieppe.  This minimizes potential political bias. The document is also valuable in its content as a first-person account that includes many valuable details that are absent in secondary documents.

 In relation to its origin, the document is limited because it is not entirely a raw account since  it was written in 1993 with the assistance of John’s son, then revised in 2003. This time gap from Dieppe means some details may be inaccurate. With reference to its purpose, the document is limited due to Edmonson’s educational background since he is not a historian. The document is also limited in its content due to potential emotional bias against Canadian or British military leadership given Edmonson’s traumatizing experiences as a soldier.

关于它的起源，这份文件是有限的，因为它不是完全原始的描述，因为它是在1993年在约翰的儿子的帮助下写的，然后在2003年修订。与Dieppe的时间差意味着一些细节可能不准确。就其目的而言，由于埃德蒙森不是历史学家，他的教育背景有限。考虑到埃德蒙森作为一名士兵的创伤经历，这份文件的内容也受到了限制，因为对加拿大或英国军方领导人的潜在情感偏见。

 Section Two: Historical Investigation第二节历史考察

The Allied assault on Dieppe, the bloodiest and most controversial Canadian military action of World War Two, was indisputably a disaster. This Canadian-led amphibious raid failed strategically, operationally, and tactically. This nine-hour battle on August 19, 1942 resulted in 3371 casualties, among the 4963 Canadian soldiers involved.[1] This staggering casualty toll has led historians to ask, how did an operation of such scale, wherein Canada played a lead role, fail to such a devastating extent? To answer this question, this paper has undertaken the investigation of multiple sources such as John S. Edmondson’s Memories and Reflections on the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942 and Caroline D’Amours’ Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid 1929-1942 to account for Canada’s failure at Dieppe. It is clear that Canada’s involvement in the reckless Dieppe operation was a result of specific strategic failures and limited rehearsal and experience in amphibious operational design. The consequential outcome was Canada’s tactical failure at Dieppe, worsened by superior enemy weaponry.

盟军对Dieppe的进攻是二战中最血腥、最具争议的加拿大军事行动，毫无疑问是一场灾难。这次加拿大领导的两栖突袭在战略上、行动上和战术上都失败了。1942年8月19日，这场长达9个小时的战斗造成了3371人的伤亡，其中4963名加拿大士兵参战如此惊人的伤亡人数让历史学家们不禁要问，如此大规模、由加拿大主导的行动，怎么会没有达到如此毁灭性的程度呢?要回答这个问题,本文进行了多个来源的调查,如约翰·s·埃德蒙森的回忆和反思1942年8月19日的DieppeRaid和卡罗琳D幻的战术和训练燧发枪团的皇家山上和多个强固1929 - 1942在Dieppe占加拿大的失败。很明显，加拿大参与Dieppe行动是由于具体的战略失败，以及在两栖作战设计方面有限的演练和经验。结果是加拿大在Dieppe的战术失败，敌人的武器优势使其雪上加霜。

In addition to domestic and global political pressures, the lack of active Canadian involvement in the formation of a wider strategic policy for Dieppe forced Canada’s participation in a reckless operation. Despite Canada’s constitutional right to act independently, the political ramifications and the breakdown of morale as a result of prolonged inaction pushed the Canadian government and generals to blindly support Dieppe[2]. The original version, Operation Rutter, was cancelled due to German discovery of the plan and poor weather, which removed all planned elements of surprise for the attack.[3] Although changes were made to the plan after the cancellation of the original operation, the target remained the same, resulting in a massive security risk. However, the Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten, still pushed forward with the support of Canadian military leadership despite the risk of the German knowledge of the attack. This would explain the heavily fortified beach wall with defensive German concrete barriers and air-tank guns. In fact, as Peter J. Henshaw argues, “the intersection of three protracted bureaucratic struggles left the Canadian Army commanders in Britain with unprecedented powers.”[4] These conflicts gave senior Canadian commanders full operational freedom to commit Canadian forces to the large-scale raid, wherein the Canadian Army would not be under the command of British officers.[5] With this full and final authority, Canadian officials could have removed Canadian involvement from the Dieppe raid if they deemed it necessary on military grounds. However, even with security and preparation concerns proposed by British generals Montgomery and Paget, and the British Intelligence, Canadian military leadership still fully supported Dieppe.[6] Moreover, the Canadian government was partially responsible for the lack of Canadian input on the strategic approach for Dieppe. Canadians played little to no part in formulating a wider strategic policy for Dieppe, but, this would not have been the case had Canada demanded a voice in the higher direction of war, like Australia.  {discuss what Canadian involvement in formulating the strategic policy would have achieved}. Henshaw asserts, “To the Canadian prime minister, shared direction of the war looked too much like a scheme for centralizing power in London”.[7] Mackenzie King refused to relinquish the country’s equivalent constitutional status. This lack of involvement would lead to an operational failure due to lack of insight. It was unfortunate that the political and military leadership used their moment of greatest independence and control to ensure Canadian participation at the tragic Dieppe raid.

Given lack of experience and effective rehearsal, the overly detailed and rigid amphibious operational plan set for Dieppe led to Canada’s tactical failure. With the limitations of time and resources, Canadian soldiers and military leadership did not receive sufficient information nor training to accomplish the strategic objectives. The lack of beach intelligence, which had severely underestimated the geographical obstacles and German defenses[8], further hindered the already limited military expertise and tactical knowledge of the Canadian army. Given the complex nature of the operation, Caroline D’Armous argues: “members of the infantry unit had to master the various technical elements of amphibious operations… the infantrymen needed to become familiar with cooperation with tanks, the RN, and the RAF.”[9] In pre-Dieppe raid drills Yukon I and II, there was limited coordination between different Canadian regiments, despite the great emphasis amphibious operational doctrine had placed on the support of tanks for the infantry troops and pre-aerial bombing.[10] Moreover, there was a lack of systematic defensive tactical training, which would be pivotal given the German fortification at Dieppe.[11] This amplified the faults of Canada’s outdated military doctrine, adopted from the British.  D’Amours explains, “German victory over France in the spring of 1940 highlighted the British Army’s slow tempo in action, due to outdated tactics and lack of initiative at all levels, as well as the German Army’s superior training.”[12] The introduction of machine guns and tanks resulted in a decentralized battlefield, which exposed the flaw of the British autocratic command system at Dieppe, especially given the geographic advantage German troops had at Dieppe. Essentially, when Canadian troops were dispersed, soldiers of all ranks were required to make proper decisions, which demanded initiative, intelligence, and in-depth military knowledge.[13] With inconsistent military training, the pre-Dieppe raid drills especially lacked training on flexibility, initiative, and military instinct for junior leaders, who would be required to take on the role of senior leaders in a decentralized battlefield. However, the essential fault, as Harald Høiback addresses, was that “the operational plan for Jubileewas so detailed that it left no room for improvisation once things began to go wrong.”[14] A small mistake would lead to the failure of a subsequent regiment, leading to a disastrous domino effect. With poor operational design, the tactical execution was doomed to fail at Dieppe.

The poor execution of the frontal Dieppe assault was further worsened by insufficient naval and aerial support against superior German weaponry and deficient Allied communication lines.  The Allies relied heavily on the element of surprise in the execution of Dieppe; as David O’Keefe explains, “the key to success lay in a multi-faceted approach underscored by three intricate pillars – namely, surprise, shock, and security.” This doctrine was well understood prior to Dieppe, meaning the operational planning fell short of tactical common sense. They lost the element of surprise when the Allies accidentally encountered German naval force before reaching the Dieppe beach, alerting German land forces when they heard the naval fighting. Shock was not achieved by the Allies, with limited aircraft ability to use sudden and suppressive firepower. John S. Edmonson, a war veteran who fought at Dieppe, explains, “… there was to be no heavy bombing of the Dieppe landing areas before disembarking because the Air Force could not guarantee accuracy.” Security was not achieved either, with the previously leaked version of the raid, Operation Rutter. The failed surprise attack, in addition to the late arrival of multiple regiments responsible for tanks such as the 14th Tank Army Regiment, exposed Canadian troops to German gunfire upon landing on shore, immediately killing thousands. Most critically, as Mark Zuehlke reasons, “they were stymied by superior weaponry… the impartial assessment of Gernealleutnat Konrad Haase, who immediately after the raid acknowledged the gallantry and skill of all the troops engaged in the raid while pointing out the hopelessness of their assignment.” The Allies lost one hundred and six aircraft, thirty-three landing craft, HMS Berkeley, and all of the twenty-nine tanks relative to the forty-eight aircraft loss for the Germans, their only significant loss. The failure was worsened by demolished communication lines, which turned the situation hopeless. Officers on Calpe and Fernie never wholly received the messages sent to them, resulting in Major General John Hamilton Roberts’ disastrous assumption that the Allies were succeeding. He sent Fusiliers Mont-Royal to take advantage, only to also be annihilated. With a casualty toll just shy of sixty-eight percent, it was evident that superior enemy firepower not only ensured a German victory at Dieppe but also annihilated Canadian forces.

由于对德国先进武器的海空支援不足，以及盟军通讯线路的不足，Dieppe战役的执行力进一步恶化。盟军在处决迪埃普时主要依靠出其不意的手段;正如David O 'Keefe所解释的那样，“成功的关键在于通过三个复杂的支柱来强调的多方面的方法——即意外、冲击和安全。”在Dieppe之前，这一理论已经被人们很好地理解了，这意味着作战计划缺乏战术常识。当盟军在到达Dieppe海滩之前意外遇到德国海军时，他们失去了出其不意的因素，当他们听到海战的声音时，就通知了德国陆军。由于盟军有限的飞机使用突然和压制火力的能力，盟军并没有造成冲击。约翰·s·埃德蒙森，一位曾在Dieppe作战的老兵，解释说，“……在登陆Dieppe之前，不会有对其登陆区域的猛烈轰炸，因为空军无法保证准确。”在之前泄露的“鲁特行动”中，安全问题也没有得到解决。这次突袭失败，加上负责坦克的多个团(如第14坦克军团)的姗姗来迟，使加拿大军队在登陆海岸时就暴露在德国人的炮火之下，立即造成数千人死亡。最重要的是，正如Mark Zuehlke所解释的，“他们被先进的武器阻止了……Gernealleutnat Konrad Haase的公正评价，他在突袭后立即承认所有参与突袭的部队的勇气和技能，同时指出他们的任务是绝望的。”盟军损失了106架飞机，33艘登陆艇，HMS伯克利号，以及全部29辆坦克，而德国损失了48架飞机，这是他们唯一的重大损失。通讯线路被拆除，使失败变得更加糟糕，使情况变得绝望。卡尔佩和弗尔尼的军官们从来没有完全收到发给他们的信息，这导致了约翰·汉密尔顿·罗伯茨少将灾难性地认为盟军会取得胜利。他派燧发枪兵去皇家山乘虚而入，结果也被歼灭。伤亡人数不到68%，很明显，敌人强大的火力不仅确保了德国在Dieppe的胜利，还歼灭了加拿大军队。

At Dieppe, the Allied forces’ strategic, operational, and tactical failures resulted in the loss of thousands of men. Firstly, Canada’s limited participation at the strategic level resulted in a significant lack of insight and common sense at the operational and tactical level, wherein senior Canadian commanders had full control of. Secondly, once Canadian troops had fully committed to the Dieppe raid, they were inherently limited in time and resources, as well as their outdated military doctrine, which resulted in ineffective preparation. Finally, the failed surprise attack with grave mistakes committed by multiple regiments, resulted in a domino effect, worsened by faulty communications lines and superior enemy weaponry. While the Allied forces’ failure at Battle of Dieppe cost thousands of lives as the bloodiest battle of World War Two, it taught the Allies many important lessons on amphibious operations, ensuring success for the next raid. Truly, the Dieppe Raid was a prelude to D-Day, the greatest Allied success in World War Two // Truly, the Dieppe Raid was a prelude to D-Day, a military journey from tragedy to triumph.

Section Three: Reflection第三部分:反射

Investigating Canada’s failure at Dieppe was a very valuable and rewarding experience. I gained significant insight on the processes used by historians and the challenges they face when conducting a historical investigation. First, my investigation involved a collection of primary and secondary sources. As a completely unbiased interpretation of historical events is impossible, historians must use a variety of primary and secondary sources to piece together inferences to form a well-supported argument or conclusion. I used primary sources, such as a written account by a Dieppe war veteran, to immerse myself in order to gain a deeper understanding of how events unfolded at Dieppe. Combined with several secondary sources such as scholarly articles and books, which provided thorough analysis of Dieppe by historians, I was able to form my own conclusion.

调查加拿大在Dieppe的失败是一次非常宝贵和有益的经验。我对历史学家使用的过程和他们在进行历史调查时所面临的挑战有了重要的了解。首先，我的调查收集了一手和二手资料。由于不可能对历史事件作出完全公正的解释，历史学家必须利用各种第一手和二手资料，把推论拼凑起来，形成一个有充分依据的论点或结论。我使用第一手资料，例如Dieppe一位老兵的书面描述，让自己沉浸其中，以便更深入地了解Dieppe的事件是如何展开的。结合学术文章和书籍等二手资料，历史学家对迪埃普进行了详尽的分析，我得出了自己的结论。

After collecting sources, I used historians’ methods in my investigation to determine the credibility of each source. I assessed the source’s author and their relationship to the subject, the author’s intent, the intended audience of the source, and the balance of different perspectives in the work. With respect to the origin, purpose, and content of each source, I determined its value and limitations. During this process, I found that a source that I had selected, David O’Keefe’s One Day in August, the Untold Story Behind Canada’s Tragedy at Dieppe, was limited in terms of its purpose and content given its one-sided take on Dieppe, with a focus on the British Intelligence’s attempt to obtain German code for enigma machines. Thus, I used this source minimally in forming my arguments.

Finally, after selecting credible sources, I used other historians’ analysis and conclusions to form a more-informed perspective on Canada’s failure at Dieppe. However, given that history is not based on purely subjective information like mathematics and science, I recognized that regardless of the source used, there is always an inherent bias. Thus, it is important to use as much as a variety of sources as possible – I did so to ensure that my investigation is based off a clear understanding of Dieppe, based on historical records and historical analysis. This experience gave me insight on the dedication required of historians. Overall, in this period where I acted as a historian, I was able to better understand the role of historians in analyzing our past and predicting our future through their understanding of the human race.

最后，在选择了可靠的资料来源后，我利用其他历史学家的分析和结论，对加拿大在Dieppe的失败形成了一个更有见地的视角。然而，考虑到历史不是像数学和科学那样基于纯粹的主观信息，我意识到无论使用的来源是什么，总会有一种固有的偏见。因此，尽可能多地利用各种来源是很重要的——我这样做是为了确保我的调查是基于对Dieppe的清晰理解，基于历史记录和历史分析。这段经历让我深刻认识到历史学家所需要的奉献精神。总的来说，在我作为历史学家的这段时间里，我能够更好地理解历史学家通过他们对人类的理解来分析我们的过去和预测我们的未来。

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