论我国农村信用社参与国际农业发展基金项目的限制因素_留学生作业

论我国农村信用社参与国际农业发展基金项目的限制因素
Factors impacting on the involvement of RCCs in IFAD projects

关于农发基金贷款的程序限制
Procedural limitations pertaining to use of IFAD loans

财政部农发基金资金使用上的严重程序的限制。这些资金是通过贷款到乡镇一级，乡镇项目办最终负责偿还。The MOF has placed severe procedural limitations on the use of IFAD funds. These funds are passed as loans to the township level, and township PMOs are ultimately responsible for repayment. This makes it difficult to bring about the necessary interaction between PMOs and RCCs at the township level. The relevant regulations [see paragraph 9.1 of main report] constitute a twofold challenge to IFAD projects. First, MOF or finance departments at the provincial level cannot assign IFAD loans to PBC, RCCs or other financial institutions. Second, the township governments may not use IFAD funds for activities other than credit, as such funds have to be repaid. It does not appear to be a realistic proposition to expect governments of poor townships to repay the funds used for the development of rural infrastructure, training and other activities.

The PMO model has been a convenient tool in the context of current MOF procedures, as the borrower of IFAD loans. IFAD loans are passed on directly to the provinces and are repayable in 30 years after a ten-year grace period, and with associated exchange risk. The provincial government bears the exchange risk and passes the loan on to the subsequent lower level, repayable in 15 years after ten years' grace. The township government, which ultimately receives IFAD loan funds, has to repay the borrowed amount to the higher levels of administration.

IFAD credit funds are used as intended for lending to the households, but MOF regulations prevent townships from using such funds for infrastructure development and other related activities. Instead, townships use them for providing credit to households, which can be recovered and repaid. 这表明农发基金的限制：遇到挫折的项目提供资金，用于基础设施建设和其他活动，但这些资金不被用作需要。乡政府用100％的资金用于农村基础设施建设、培训和其他活动，但不包括政府信用。
This means that IFAD's intentions are thwarted: the projects provide funds for infrastructure development and other activities but these funds are not used as required. Township governments use 100% government funds for rural infrastructure, training and other activities, excluding credit. This is in conflict with IFAD's intention as allocations have been made for such components in the project documents. Instead, township governments claim reimbursement from IFAD for all activities. The reimbursements received from IFAD for rural infrastructure and other activities are again deployed for providing credit to households. This is in addition to funds allocated for credit.

The mission's discussions and fact finding suggest that the entire IFAD loan is used for the credit component, while the township governments use counterpart funds to undertake other activities. The rationale behind this is that the IFAD funds are loan funds and will have to be returned or repaid, so they need to be deployed as loans and not for infrastructure and other investments that cannot be recovered directly from private households as 'repayment.' For as long as MOF uses the current procedure of passing on IFAD funds as loans, local governments at the township level will find it difficult to absorb IFAD credit for infrastructure and other activities and repay the same at a later date. This conclusion is based on probing questions and discussions with project management staff. The success of RCCs is predicated on a set of complex institutional issues that range far beyond the apparently simple one of margin availability.

The township, county and provincial governments are unwilling to place the funds - which they will ultimately have to repay - with the RCCs and thereby relinquish control over their use. They see no role for themselves in IFAD projects if the funds allocated for the credit component are passed on to the RCCs. It will be impossible to integrate PMO and RCC activities within the IFAD project framework if MOF continues its current loan deployment procedure. Instead, one possible solution would be for township governments to receive IFAD funds as grants from MOF for rural infrastructure, training and other activities, together with loan funds for the credit component.

The MOF argues that the major constraint on a shift to the RCC model is the poor health of RCCs and the risk of non-repayment of funds provided to them. This argument is not valid. First, the poor performance of RCCs is not due to the above-mentioned problems of the institution alone. Second, macro factors linked to government policy - including governance issues, historic bad loans and the policy environment - militate against generating longer-term sustainable growth for RCCs. Third, to advance reforms and permit higher rural economic growth and employment, the Government will need to assist the RCCs to restructure, supported by relevant enabling policies and regulatory framework.

农村信用合作社的激励限制因素Limited incentive Sstructure for RCCs http://www.ukassignment.org/lxslw/

The RCCs have limited incentive to operate within the current framework of cooperation with PMOs. Four factors contribute, namely (i) high cost of funds; (ii) perceived high credit risk; (iii) inconsistencies in lending policies and procedures; and (iv) perceived non-requirement of external funding.

资金成本Cost of funds

IFAD funds are channelled to the provinces by MOF at a very high cost, passing through five administrative layers before reaching the RCCs. It passes the funds with credit risk and exchange risk to the provinces, but it charges 4.5% to the respective provincial Finance Department as against the 0.75% charged by IFAD. It has, however, passed on World Bank project funds to the provinces at considerably lower rates. However, in 2000, IFAD secured more advantageous or reduced margin requirements in the transfer of funds to the provinces.#p#分页标题#e#

It may be argued that the cost structure for RCCs under IFAD projects unwittingly ensures failure of the RCC model. The interest rate spread for RCCs is too low for them to be interested in seeking IFAD funding. The rate of interest on loans to households varies from project to project. In the Sichuan Livestock Development Project, in the areas where the RCC model is being tried, the rate of interest charged to households is 12.06%, whereas in areas with the PMO model the rate of interest is 8%. The spread available to RCCs varies from 1.1% to 1.3% in the Southwest Anhui Integrated Agricultural Development Project. The RCCs have been promised an additional spread of 1.5% by PMOs. In practice, this would mean that the PMOs would have first to receive a 1.5% spread refund from MOF prior to passing this refund on to RCCs.

The average cost of RCC funds, as calculated by interest expenditure to outstanding deposits, has been declining steadily over recent years following PBC's downward revision of interest rates. The overall cost of funds declined from about 6% in 1997 to about 4% in 1999. The weighted average rate of interest for new deposit mobilization is much less than the RCCs' current average cost of funds. The latter ranges from 1.75% to 2.21% and is falling, with a declining proportion of time deposits of longer maturity.

It is definitely not a viable business proposition for RCCs to accept project funds at 6-7% when additional funds could be mobilized at a rate not exceeding 2.26% (excluding the cost of mobilization). In addition, the cost of deposit mobilization by RCCs is approximately 1.35% of the total deposit outstanding. The upper limit of total cost of funds is estimated at about 3.6%. To wit, PBC provides funds to RCCs at 2.9% interest. The high cost of funds has acted as a disincentive for RCCs, not only in terms of participating fully in IFAD projects but also with regard to taking the full credit risk. It can be safely assumed that RCCs would not be able to accept project funds at a cost exceeding 3-3.6%.

The design of IFAD projects has assumed that a spread of 4-4.5% should suffice to cover all costs of credit delivery, recovery and credit risk, and make for a reasonable profit. This hypothesis is also invalid. Based on the survey of RCCs in five provinces, it was found that the RCCs were able to employ a spread of 7% in 1995, but performance has not improved since then. 较大的需求仍然存在，并明确表示，目前农村信用社的激励机制并不鼓励他们参与农发基金项目。The need for a larger margin remains, clearly indicating that the current incentive structure for RCCs does not encourage them to participate in IFAD projects.

信贷风险Perceived credit risk

Even if a sufficient margin is provided to the RCCs to bear the full credit risk, they require complete independence in selecting the borrowers. Once the RCCs achieve complete independence, the RCCs will probably reject about 40-50% of all loan applications forwarded by the PMOs, since the RCCs rightly place emphasis on the credit history and the repaying capacity of the clients. This means a completely changed credit delivery scenario: the credit uptake will be far less than the current projections.

贷款政策和程序的不同Differences in lending policies and procedures

There are three inconsistencies between the project-propagated and RCCs' own credit delivery systems. They pertain to: (i) loan size; (ii) loan duration; and (iii) the requirement for a no-due certificate. The size of the loans provided to households under the project varies from CNY 500 to CNY 3 000. Most loans for agroforestry plantation, irrigation and land development are about CNY 3 000, and loans for pig raising, pig breeding, duck raising, etc., are about CNY 500. In comparison, the sizes of RCCs' own loans to the households are usually smaller.

The RCCs provide short-term loans not exceeding one year. This helps RCCs to recycle funds at a faster rate and achieve a higher effective rate of interest on loans. The loans provided under the project are medium to long-term in nature. Even duck- and pig-raising, which yield returns within one year, are supported through loans with a two-to-three-year repayment period.

The RCCs insist on a no-due certificate from prospective borrowers. This means the households with outstanding loans from ABC or a PMO cannot obtain a loan from an RCC. This procedure does not apply in PMOs, and therefore it is an important issue as it potentially lowers the quality of lending through PMOs.

外部资金的供求有限Limited demand for external funding

The mission visited some RCCs that felt that external funding was not required for their operations. This was more evident in Jiangxi Province, where the RCCs felt that adequate deposits could be mobilized to fund their lending programme. At the current lending rate, RCCs find it risky to provide loans to poor households. In contrast, empirical evidence confirms unmet credit demand and willingness to borrow at higher interest. New credit products with flexible interest rates and incentives for on-time repayment could enhance both credit demand and the incentives for RCCs to expand lending.

Current scenario

Given the constraints in implementing the RCC model as prescribed in IFAD project documents, the RCCs and PMOs in Anhui Province have reached a tactical arrangement to facilitate implementation. The PMOs continue to bear the credit risk and the RCCs deliver loans to all borrowers identified by the PMOs. This contrasts with the subsidiary loan agreements signed between the RCCs and the PMOs, where the PMOs stipulate that the full credit risk remains with RCCs and that the latter will have complete autonomy to select borrowers. According to PBC, this is an 'agent arrangement' between the PMOs and RCCs.#p#分页标题#e#

The future

转向可持续发展提供金融服务
Shift towards sustainable financial service delivery

The strengths and weaknesses of the PMO model need careful analysis. It is true that, in the absence of more mature local-level financial institutions, the PMO-administered credit lines have satisfied a need. It is also true that the users (borrowers) of the credit disbursed by PMOs may put a premium on accessing credit and be less concerned about their ability to pay back. In this context, one particular weakness in the PMO model stands out. It is inherent in all project administered credit lines, and is not unique to China. Government officials who administer credit can rarely acquire the information necessary for proper appraisal of clients and their proposed ventures. For a proper review of loan applications, they need information from local informal networks about clients' suitability to reduce the risk of low recovery and of bad debts. In technical literature, limited access to such data is termed 'information asymmetry'. On the other hand, such knowledge is held by local informants or obtained when systems are used for peer review of credit applications. Local financial institutions that operate at the township, county and community levels build up such information. The PMO model of credit delivery using the Finance Offices does not form part of the local financial infrastructure: PMOs have limited access to reliable information for assessing and reducing risk. Errors in loan appraisals are thus more likely to arise and the probability of bad debts and low loan recovery increases.

在中国，农村信用社是必需的入口点进入本地金融基础设施。In China, RCCs are the necessary entry point into the local financial infrastructure. The overall financial activity in the rural areas originates from the RCCs and returns to them. Apart from helping integration with the local financial infrastructure, a shift to the RCC model has two distinct advantages. First, given the evidence of the huge demand for credit in the rural areas of China, no donor will be able to satisfy such demand by adopting solutions that are institutionally non-sustainable.

Donors should, instead, 应充分利用当地资源，以发展本地金融基础设施，能转移，从传统的以扶贫为重点的贷款。consider using funds to leverage local resources in order to develop local financial infrastructure capable of shifting from traditional to poverty-focused lending. The efficiency gains that could be captured by leveraging local resources or unshackling part of the local resources for poverty alleviation are immense. For example, the Jiangxi/Ganzhou Integrated Agricultural Development Project covers 47 townships. Using the PMO model of credit delivery, CNY 193 million are to be allocated for five years. The annual credit disbursement is estimated at about CNY 39 million. In contrast, total savings for all the RCCs involved were found to be not less than about CNY 380 million (each RCC in the project area had an outstanding savings balance of approximately CNY 8 million). Were IFAD projects able to leverage only 10% of these funds for microfinance every year, the allocation for credit would double.

The second advantage is that the management information system of the local financial infrastructure is generally well developed compared with that of non-financial institutions. The former are transparent with regard to utilization of funds and under the supervision of the Central Bank.

These reasons rightly prompted IFAD to move towards use of RCCs. In addition, the Government has also realized the importance of integrating credit services with those of the local financial infrastructure. It has issued guidelines prohibiting all credit-related activities through government departments. IFAD was the first IFI to experiment with integrating project-funded credit operations with those of RCCs. As with any first effort, it has not been without difficulties but what is positive is that lessons are being learned.

The findings of the present study were presented at a Technical Review Workshop in Beijing in July 2000, the aim being to: (i) disseminate study findings; (ii) arrive at a common understanding of issues confronting the implementation of credit components under IFAD projects; and (iii) reach broad agreement on future action. Details of the workshop are provided as Annex 6 of the main report. The recommendations set out below are broadly in line with the workshop deliberations.