亚齐灾后重建的经验教训 通过单独的政府机构协调 协调被广泛认定为灾后重建的实质性问题。印尼政府的反应即在亚齐的创建。BRR的建立即为一个单一的政府机构负责监督复兴计划的实现,提供了必要的协调机制大量的人道主义机构,抵达受灾地区。作为中央政府的一个扩展和一个单独的政府机构,即可以立即提供必要的权威非政府捐助者和政府实施机构开始他们的计划,并帮助他们优先考虑他们的程序,以确保有效的复苏计划和测序有有限的重复和没有,尽可能出现一个缺口。
BRR的经验在协调很多国际援助提供者,涌向亚齐支持救灾和重建工作提供了一个模式,可能影响联合国组织的救灾。现在已经开发了一个集群的系统组织援助机构和其他非政府组织的救灾工作(da Silva, 2009).
BRR's experience in coordinating the many international aid providers that flocked to Aceh to support the relief and reconstruction effort provided a pattern that may have influenced the United Nations in its organization of disaster relief. It has now developed a 'cluster' system to organize aid agencies' and other NGOs' relief efforts (da Silva, 2009).
Developing action plans for long term recovery is needed for the Aceh government. This means that there should be developed a recovery and rehabilitation policy for local government, including expertise requirements for large scale construction and realistic timeframes. Action plans can be used as the basis for deciding on resource coordination responsibilities in the crisis, including data capture and analysis, Global Information Systems and other informational management technologies. Local government also needs to conduct a review of all tsunami evaluations and lessons learned and synthesis key elements from all stakeholders. Evaluations need to be followed-up by action plans and then ensure that follow up action plans are implemented so that short-term and long-term are considered together.
BRR has encouraged its implementing partners to similarly transfer decision making in project planning and execution to its team in the field. For instance, the decision of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to shift its command post from Manila to the earthquake and Tsunami emergency Program in Aceh resulted in less bottlenecks and a significant improvement in the implementation process (Subekti, 2008). However, there were some situations where the wider issues of public administration (or governance) overlap with the issues that arise from decentralization. In Banda Aceh, because of confusion and lack of transparency over key policy issues, such as the location and status of the coastal buffer zone, there was some debilitation of both the relief and recovery phases. This is a clear case of need for government to have clear mechanisms which resonate with the principles of good governance.
Such reform, while essential to the recovery program and welcomed by implementing partners, needs to be carefully conceived, broadly considered, and implemented within models of best practices. There is a greater risk implementing regulatory reform within a post-disaster situation because of the way that short-term and long-term needs can become entangled (Subekti, 2008). Clearly the need to keep long-term impacts in mind when undertaking short-term actions in a recovery or reconstruction program applies to a number of government and non-government agencies and to many fields of endeavour. The impact on physical outputs such as housing has already been identified but it can be seen to apply equally to public policy actions, such as regulatory reform.
A sometimes neglected aspect of future disaster planning is maintaining community disaster awareness. Simeulu Island, in Aceh province, is a good example of the way that local knowledge and community awareness can help mitigate the impact of disasters. When the tsunami was coming people moved very quickly to higher ground. Very few people were killed by the tsunami on Simeulu Island. This was because knowledge and experience of past tsunamis had been passed from generation to generation.#p#分页标题#e#
提供厕所和水是任何房地产项目的重要组成部分——Provision of Toilets and Access to Water is an Essential Part of any Housing Program Whilst the focus on disaster rescue operations is often on the provision of shelter and housing, the lesson to be learned from Aceh's experience is that housing and infrastructure need to be considered together. At its most basic this implies considering housing together with the provision of potable water and human waste disposal facilities; but in the longer term the provision of other forms of physical and social infrastructure need to be considered to support the provision of housing. In Aceh, mostly, agencies provided toilets and wells themselves as part of an integrated shelter, water and sanitation program, with the option to connect to piped water supplies where this was available. Where this was outside their area of expertise, they formed partnerships with other NGOs who committed to constructing toilets and providing water. However, this was often problematic. Partner agencies had other priorities, and were not always able to coordinate provision of facilities and services with completion of the houses (Silva, 2009).
In addition, radio was used quite successfully in Aceh to update affected communities on the recovery progress and to enable community members to ask questions. A variety of call-in programs focused on both reconstruction assistance and psycho-social support. A key lesson here is the value of using familiar and established media outlets (CCP-I, 2009).
Strengthen skills in sector based coordination, particularly when a number of humanitarian actors is involved, and look towards international agencies for coherence and cohesion. Governments need to develop a specific coordination strategy with an associated resource plan for emergency response situations. NGOs and other donors should make a special effort to coordinate with local governments. NGOs and other donor providers are one of the keys to success in implementing a recovery program. Donors and NGOs need to work with the central and local governments in rationalizing the donor coordination function through one office. Central Government should formulate the framework of coordination among recovery stakeholders. Coordination between and within ministries, between levels of government, and other recovery stakeholders is vital. Effective coordination to ensure consistency and effectiveness among sectoral and regional programs at national and regional levels is critical, given that aspects of reconstruction, such as housing, education, employment and infrastructure, touch on many sector responsibilities and ministerial and government interests. Central government should be allocated the adequate resources to support mechanism of coordination in the recovery and reconstruction phases. Central government should link the tsunami warning system to other hazard warning systems and strengthen the warning systems as part of an integrated disaster risk reduction approach. National plans for warning systems should address the means to transmit warnings and should be included in disaster management, public awareness and community-based activities. Coordination and warning systems should be components a national disaster management plans. There is need for capacity building to coordinate NGOs and donors and provide guidance for recovery processes. Local government should build the capacity of local communities and strengthen the coordination among the aid agencies of recovery efforts
Major communication and information-sharing problems occurred between government agencies and with the international community. There is a need to recognize these difficulties and to develop a system that would overcome them, so that there is clear direction for stakeholders in the recovery and reconstruction process. District government needs more structural capacity-building support to absorb new personnel, fill positions and face new challenges from the central and provincial government. At national/provincial level, disparities between the training, positions and the like of national and local staff lead to resentment. The central government should strengthen Aceh government staff capacity caused by the 30-year separatist conflict, empower the local authorities, and become more effectively engaged with local communities. This is a clear case where the opportunities made available through the unfortunate impact of the disaster need to be seized at a number of different levels. The commitment to peace, triggered to some extent by the tsunami disaster, needs to flow through to the community in a number of different ways. The key element for reducing corruption in post-disaster situations for a long term process is good governance. The government needs to undertake the planning for allocation of funds for recovery and it should be approved by the legislature. The community should be informed the flow of aid and other funds until the services/goods are delivered. This incorporates aspects of good governance identified by major international organizations such as the UNDP. One mechanism for supporting greater coordination would be to develop relevant shared databases. The assessments of recovery should be conducted by multi-agency teams to the extent practicable. The assessments should be periodically updated. Common databases within existing government structures can greatly facilitate coherence.
Aid agencies and the government of Indonesia should develop methodologies to increase affected communities' involvement in setting priorities, design of programs and monitoring of implementation. International action in Banda Aceh was most effective when enabling, facilitating and supporting local actors. International agencies often brushed local capacities aside, even though they subscribe to norms and standards that call for engagement with and accountability to local actors such as governments, communities and local NGOs. International agencies often ignored local structures and did not communicate well with local communities nor hold themselves accountable to them. This drive towards greater involvement of local communities should also include the development of local community and local government capacities. The importance of the local population being able to participate in the provision of facilities was reinforced in Banda Aceh. The Acehnese needed to be contributors to rather than having to wait for the recovery of their houses and settlements. A people-centred and participative rehabilitation and reconstruction process is important. Participation in planning, construction, and monitoring is important in the recovery process. There is, however, a clear need to establish a community-based approach that provides outreach to all of the Aceh community to be involved in the recovery by identifying gaps in village reconstruction and matching these to projects and funds. The approach should not rely just on participation by community representatives or elites. There is also a need to increase community knowledge about natural hazards that may affect them. In the case of Banda Aceh this includes earthquakes, tsunamis, storms and flooding. For example, in relation to earthquakes, there should be increased science-based earthquake education. Extending formal and informal hazard education initiatives to women is imperative. A staring point should be promoting literacy, developing appropriate curriculum materials, and training teachers and women leaders. Training should address life-saving hazard drills, basic hazard science, risk awareness, and information about building appropriate dwellings. Women should be respected as able community defenders and disaster management professionals.
Similar staffing capacity problems were faced by aid agencies. The international agencies were faced with problems including high staff turnover, inappropriate job profiling, loss of institutional memory, and marked disparities in remuneration. To address these issues needs long term plans to provide incentives to trained and capable staff and to include succession planning within the organizations. Central government should involve the local government apparatus in every activity of recovery in their villages or sub-districts. This may involve the payment of special allowances or honoraria for specific activities. As noted elsewhere special consideration needs to be given to maintaining the peace accord involving the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The central government together with aid agencies and local government should give priority to including ex-members of GAM. The limitation of educational levels of GAM ex-members for the time being must be put aside in order to help increase social harmony. Peace is important in achieving reconstruction in Aceh. The lesson learned from Aceh is that whilst a disaster can help bring together parties who are in violent disagreement agreements forged in the light of disaster conditions need to be nurtured throughout the recovery and reconstruction phases and beyond.
Long-term development plans and disaster management plans should include mechanisms that ensure that government and aid agencies are involved in evaluations of action plans and can ensure that follow up action plans are implemented. The Aceh government should maintain investment in preparedness programs to help make the society more resilient. As has already been noted, the best policy for effective post-disaster recovery is to prepare for the event before disaster strikes. This can be achieved by strengthening the system of disaster management and preparedness within government and community at all levels. In addition disaster recovery planning needs to feature in higher education to prepare key professions for the challenge of recovery planning and management. Public education should be designed to enhance disaster resilience and strengthen the capacity and capability of individuals, families, schools and the communities, which are always the most vulnerable to disasters, but are also effective channels for achieving sustainability and prosperity. One way of achieving this preparedness would be to develop a Disaster Management Bill that aimed to strengthen the capacities for disaster management, preparedness and response of relevant government agencies. Disaster and recovery planning could be aided by better information on natural hazards. Both the Indonesian and the Aceh government should pursue a coordinated, interdisciplinary effort to further the understanding of earthquake prediction and of earthquake impacts, for example. An important element of disaster management planning would be for the Aceh government to form a new recovery task-force or commission drawn from existing governmental agencies to manage the recovery and reconstruction processes. This new organization could handle the recovery management with a special task force for long term outcomes. Such an agency is needed to cope with the unprecedented demands that may cross all sectors when the next natural disaster strikes Aceh. It should operate in close coordination with the existing system government and be run by existing officials, from within existing line ministries.
There is a need to develop an information network to reach "people in tents and shelters" that monitors progress of the reconstruction process and handles complaints, brings up controversial issues and ideas for improvement. Local government should ensure that its public communications such as telephone, internet and access to mass-media work and its various programs are aligned when they are implemented.
Other areas of potential future research - relating to problems that were identified in the research but for which there were not the time or resources to follow up in more depth include: Ways of better integrating short-term recovery actions with long term development; Assessing the importance of cultural and belief issues and their impacts in disaster recovery; Whilst BRR was a centralized organization which coordinated actions, are there other structures or institutions for of improving coordination in post-disaster crises; and The role of the media in recovery and reconstruction - and which forms of media are the most effective for which kinds of actions.
|