影响其他商业组织世界通讯
世通公司不得不面对电信行业的不景气,所以它采取了几个步骤以夸大收益有利。最伟大和最容易的一步是连接到线的成本。相当大的线成本被从公司的利润表中被取消,然后将资产负债表中的“预付费”。此举导致美元以上线路成本38亿如资本资产而不是费用,这意味着收入夸大以及相同数量的。
“延期成本时,管理层认为未来经济效益将来自这些合同承诺的收入来自服务达到预计水平。当时,管理完全相信预计收入增长将超过抵消未来租赁承诺和递延成本下的协议。因此,闲散的延期货成本部分的合同被认为是一个适当的库存能力和最终完全摊销前终止合同的承诺。”(FASB CON No. 6, par. 26) According to Varma after understanding the complexity of SPEs and prepays of Enron, the fraud committed by WorldCom is the simplicity itself. During the the last decade of the 20th century, WorldCom was turning to one of the greatest telecommunication companies, getting control over such firms as MCI. Furthermore, WorldCom signed contracts for long-term, fixed-rate line leases. WorldCom had to face the downturn of the telecom industry, so it took several steps in favour of inflated earnings. The greatest and easiest step was connected to the cost of the lines. Sizeable line costs were lifted from the income statement of the firm then placed in the balance sheet as "Prepaid Capacity". This move resulted over $3.8 billion of line costs indicated as capitalised assets instead of expenses, meaning that the income was overstated as well by the same amount. This was a simple journal entry which passed with the approval of the Chief Financial Officer, Scott Sullivan, which changed expenses to assets by reclassification without any supporting documentation whatsoever. In the case of WorldCom the internal controls department discovered this huge failure and asked the CFO, how it could happen. Sullivan replied as quoted in the following: "At the time of the cost deferral, management had determined that future economic benefit would be derived from these contractual commitments as the revenues from these service offerings reached projected levels. At that time, management fully believed that the projected revenue increases would more than offset the future lease commitments and deferred costs under the agreements. Therefore, the cost deferrals for the unutilized portion of the contract was considered to be an appropriate inventory of this capacity and would ultimately be fully amortized prior to the termination of the contractual commitment." (FASB CON No. 6, par. 26) The previous auditor of the firm, Andersen refused to accept this explanation together with the current auditing company, KPMG, and pointed out that it is fully contradictory with GAAP. Actually Sullivan's explanation could be meant as a confession that he did not have any good reason for executing his action.
Varma(2002) states: "Adelphia subsidiaries and the Rigas entities borrowed money under a co-borrowing agreement with that made all parties jointly and severally liable for the borrowing regardless of who had drawn down the money. This meant that the debt had to be shown as a debt of the Adelphia subsidiaries (and therefore as part of Adelphia's consolidated debt) and not as a contingent liability." In March 2002, Adelphia presented the results of Q4 2001 and admitted the existence of $2.3 billion of hidden debt for the first time, and dealt with it as it was a contingent liability. The disclosure after that clarified that the amount mentioned above was indeed a part of the company's debt instead of being a simple contingent liability. The problem has been revealed that no clear burden being between the drawdowns by Adelphia and the Rigas Entities. The reclassification of the borrowed money was an arbitrage with done at the end of every financial quarter at the time of preparing the financial statements. The SEC stated: "Adelphia management allocated and reallocated co-borrowing liabilities among Adelphia's consolidated subsidiaries and unconsolidated Rigas Entities at will and through a single, quarterly cash management reconciliation of the inter-company receivables and payables outstanding at quarter end between or among Adelphia's subsidiaries and Rigas Entities" This fraud was not just considered as hiding of debt.
Governance, Supervision and Market Discipline: Lessons from Enron by Jayanth R. Varma, Journal of the Indian School of Political Economy published (October-December 2002), Volume 14 Number 4, 559-632). Arthur Andersen and Enron: Positive Influence on the Accounting Industry by? Todd Stinson McNamee, Mike and Harvy Pitt.? If You Violate the Law You Will Pay for it.? Business Week December 24, 2001: 33.#p#分页标题#e# McLean, Bethany.? Why Enron Went Bust.? Fortune December 24, 2001: 59 Schroeder, Michael and Greg Hitt. Questioning the Books: Big Accounting Firms Break Ties With Anderson to Resist Changes. The Wall Street Journal. March 4, 2002. Solomon, Deborah. After Enron, a Push to Limit Accountants toa€|Accounting. The Wall Street Journal. January 25, 2002. Schroeder, Michael. Senate Panel Seeks Sweeping Change for Auditors. The Wall Street Journal. March 7, 2002 Ditman, Dana. Accountant Caterpillar Inc. Interview. July 22, 2003.
Brown, Ken and Jonathan Weil. Questioning the Books: How Anderson's Embrace of Consulting Altered the Culture of the Auditing Firm. The Wall Street Journal. March 12, 2002 Memorandum Prepared By WorldCom CFO Scott Sullivan during June 21-24, 2002 Outlining His Position on the Transfers of WorldCom Line Costs to Capital Accounts, Exhibit 4 of Revised Statement filed by WorldCom with the United States SEC on July 8, 2002 pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Press release dated March 27, 2002 announcing results for last quarter of 2001; Form 8Ks filed with the US SEC on May 24, 2002 and June 9, 2002. AOL Time Warner, Inc. Form 8K filed with the US SEC on October 23, 2002. "Unconventional Transactions Boosted Sales: Amid Big Merger, Company Resisted Dot-Com Collapse", Washington Post, July 18, 2002 "Creative Transactions Earned Team Rewards" , Washington Post, July 19, 2002. |