美国essay范文：美国电信管制与管理的历史

美国电信管制与管理的历史

History Of Telecommunications Regulation And Management In America 

 

要充分认识当前美国电信行业，需要了解历史，如何塑造它或使它成为现在的样子。一个高效的电信系统在社会的各个方面都是如此的重要，因此政府经常介入，以确保新技术的部署在一个进一步的共同财产。电信时代的到来，一般包括一家电信公司为另一家电信公司提供服务，或者是另一家电信公司做出一些让步。”例如，美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）可能为了本地电话运营商允许竞争对手使用其地下电缆，因为这样做会让竞争对手提供新的、更好的服务。在美国，政府的介入已经显著改变了电信产业。其中一个最重要的政府行为发生在1984年，法院和FCC故意打破了美国电话电报（AT&T），这一直是一个受管制的垄断企业电话系统的。正如我写这份报告，有一个开放的竞争，在美国电信服务，提供更大的创新和优惠的定价制度相比，垄断性质的，在本文中，我们将讨论技术和政策的演变，导致在现代电信领域，并突出一些关键发现。

 

ABSTRACT 摘要

To fully understand the current telecommunications industry in America, one need to fathom the historical forces that shaped it or that made it to be where it is now. An efficient telecommunication system is so paramount in all parts of the society; so governments frequently intervene to ensure that new technology is deployed in a way to further the common property. The telecommunication era has generally involves the forcing of one telecommunications company to provide services for another or to make some other type of concession. "For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may order a local phone carrier to allow a competitor to use its underground cable because doing so would allow the competitor to provide new and better services"[1:97]. In America, the government involvement has significantly transformed the telecommunication industry. One of the most important government actions took place in 1984 when the courts and the FCC purposefully broke up American Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T), which has been a regulated monopoly phone system for much of the twentieth (20th) century. As I am writing this report, there is an open competition in telecommunication service in America, which offers greater innovation and favorable pricing system as compared to the monopolistic nature of AT&T. In this paper, we will be discussing about both the technical and policy evolution that has resulted in the modern field of telecommunication and highlighting some critical discoveries.

 

INTRODUCTION 引言

While the history of government regulation of telecommunication in the United States is as long as the history of modern civilization, the modern regulation of telecommunications is relatively short and can be dated to the rise of the telegraph in the mid-19th century. The United States left the telegraph in private hands and they have done the same with most of the significant telecommunications facilities and infrastructure that have been developed since. The decision to allow private ownership of telecommunications infrastructure has led to a rather particularized regulation of these private owners of public infrastructures. In the early part of the 20th century, the telecommunication industry in America was characterized by significant regulation and little competition. Later in the 20th century, the government attempted to reduce the restrictions on telecommunication companies.

 

ISSUES OF TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATIONS IN AMERICA 美国电信条例的问题

Generally speaking, the regulations of telecommunication in America have been of three main types: 1. common carriage requirements; 2. interconnection requirements; and 3. scarcity management. Each of these types of regulation can be illustrated through the examples of the two main telecommunications industries of the 19th and early 20th century: the telegraph and the telephone industry.

In the early 1800s, the first commercial telegraph was constructed in 1839 in Great Britain. In the United States, by the 1850s the industry was intensely competitive, with multiple carriers frequently serving identical routes. The lack of integration between systems and the low profits for providers prompted a process of consolidation that culminated in Western Union's gaining a monopoly on long-distance telegraph service by 1866. At the time, no federal antitrust law was available as a tool for regulation, so Congress responded to criticisms of Western Union by passing the United States' first telecommunication regulatory statute, the Telegraph Act of 1866. The Telegraph Act was intended to foster competition by allowing any company to erect telegraph lines along post roads, and it also included a provision whereby the United States could buy out telegraph companies if it so chose. In practice, the Telegraph Act had little practical effect, as it failed to create effective competition for Western Union, and Congress never exercised its option to buy out the company and nationalize the industry. As a result, through the latter half of the Nineteenth century, Western Union was able to charge monopoly prices, support a newswire monopoly (the Associated Press) and discriminate against disfavored customers through its pricing. The firm was also able to use its monopoly to exert substantial political influence by, among other things, refusing to give certain news organizations access to its system to transmit their reporting. For example, in the contested Presidential Election of 1876, Western Union's backing of Presidential candidate Rutherford Hayes gave the candidate important advantages both in reaching newspaper and detecting the plans of his rival [4 :1-2].

The first major federal intrusion into communications occurred with the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.This gave regulatory powers over telegraph and telephone companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission. It also established these companies as "common carriers," which "meant that telephone and telegraph companies had to offer their services without discrimination to all willing customers who were able to pay, and that they had to charge reasonable rates set by the ICC." With the Justice Department threatening antitrust action in 1913, AT&T entered into the Kingsbury Commitment, in which AT&T agreed not to acquire any other independent companies unless they got rid of another system and to allow competitors to interconnect. The end result actually wound up reducing competition, as geographic monopolies developed and interconnection actually discouraged alternative networks from being built in both local and long distance markets. Finally, in 1918 during World War I, the federal government briefly nationalized the telecommunications industry, raised rates, and the monopolization of the telephone industry was virtually complete. Again, it was the government that played the key role in monopolization. Government interference continued with the Radio Act of 1927, which nationalized the radio spectrum. The development of property rights was tossed away in favor of political, bureaucratic controls. This limited entrepreneurship and innovation, and assured that competition to Ma Bell did not emerge through wireless technologies. The big players in both radio and telephone, of course, were quite satisfied to see the government stymie potential competition [2:3].

Shortly after the Mann-Elkins Act, the United States addressed a different but related aspect of AT&T's business practices. In addition to its long-distance monopoly, AT&T provided local phone service, where it faced competition in local markets. In an attempt to eliminate this competition, AT&T routinely refused to allow non-affiliated local carriers to use its long-distance lines, thereby limiting the value of the services they could provide. In response to pressure from the Justice Department, in 1913 AT&T entered into what became known as the "Kingsbury Commitment," which required it to allow competing local providers to interconnect with AT&T's long-distance services. While important, the Kingsbury Commitment was not a full anti-discrimination remedy. It did not require that AT&T, for instance, connect its local service to that of its competitors, nor did it require AT&T to interconnect its long distance or local networks with competing long-distance carriers, should they arise in the future. The Kingsbury Commitment did not hinder AT&T from creating the phone service monopoly that it enjoyed for most of the Twentieth century, and in the view of many, it represented the U.S. acceptance of an AT&T monopoly [4:3].

 

THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 1934年通信法案

In 1934, the Congress passed the Communication Act of 1934 which established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), State Public Utilities Commission (PUCs) and the initial guidelines for the telephone industry. The Communications Act of 1934 also put into law the provision of the Kingsbury Commitment - namely, that AT& T was a regulated monopoly responsible for providing nationwide telephone service and that as a regulated monopoly, AT& T was subject to limits on the types of services they could provide and the prices they charged for those services [1:113]. The FCC works towards six goals in the areas of broadband, competition, the spectrum, the media, public safety and homeland security, and modernizing the FCC [3].

The provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 were folded into the Communications Act of 1934, which established the Federal Communications Commission and gave the Commission authority to regulate not only radio but interstate and international telegraph and telephone services as well. Its authority eventually extended to broadcast and cable television, as well as internet services. The Communications Act continues to this day to form the foundation for the regulation of these industries. At the time of the Communications Act, and indeed as early as the Kingsbury Commitment, regulators generally believed that telephone services were a natural monopoly. That is, they thought that even if there were competition in the market, the nature of the underlying technology and business were such that it was highly likely that a dominant firm would emerge to control the industry and, moreover, that this was the most efficient result. Rather than insist on what was viewed as detrimental competition in the industry, then, until the 1970s regulators supervised the Bell monopoly and regulated matters such as the rates it could charge, the quality of services it provided, and its areas of service coverage [4:4-5].#p#分页标题#e#

For most of the 20th century the main telecommunications carriers were classic regulated industries. Monopoly was tolerated, and even encouraged, by government limits on market entry and exit. In exchange government set prices at reasonable rates of return, and imposed various public interest duties (such as the fairness doctrine discussed above). However, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the 2000s, a deregulatory movement transformed telecommunications policy. By the 1920s, the AT&T telephone monopoly was complete enough that the company was able to control vertically integrated markets. For instance, AT&T in the 1930s promulgated a tariff that precluded consumers from attaching any device to their phone lines that was not specifically approved by the company. This "foreign attachments" rule effectively extended AT&T's phone service monopoly into the market for phones themselves, with the result that customers could only obtain equipment from AT&T. While this vertical integration may have represented a high watermark for AT&T's monopoly, it became the site of the first cracks in the company's monopoly[4:5].

In the word of Richard Vietor, "deregulation began more or less with a rubber cup." In the 1950s a company called Hush-a-Phone contested AT&T's foreign attachments rule, seeking permission to market what a special cup that attached to a phone and made conversations more private. The FCC, at the behest of AT&T, precluded the sale of the attachment, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision and set forth, for the first time, the rule that a consumer had a "right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental." In 1968, in the Carterphone decision, the FCC adopted this principle, and over time promulgated the Part 68 Rules, which allowed users to connect whatever they wanted to the system as long as it did not harm either the network or other users. While it would take until 1981 for the FCC to create a full consumer right to attach devices to the network, the Carterphone and Hush-a-Phone decisions represented the first introduction of competition against AT&T, and the first limiting of its extended monopoly. Eventually, the Carterphone decision was extended into a general quarantine on AT&T's involvement in consumer equipment. It also, importantly, led to rules that forced AT&T to allow others to provide "information services" over its phone lines (which would later mean "internet services") and to support the rise of the internet service provider industry[4:5-6].

At the same time, several other deregulatory initiatives were underway. In the 1970s, the firm Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI) took advantage of regulatory loopholes and non-enforcement to begin offering limited long-distance services between St. Louis and Chicago, offering AT&T the first long-distance competition it had faced in decades. AT&T took various measures to try to destroy and block its rival, leading to MCI filing an important private antitrust suit. On November 20, 1974, the Justice Department began its own antitrust action against AT&T, alleging that it monopolized the markets for a broad range of telecommunications services and equipment. While the Justice Department had brought antitrust actions against AT&T previously, this suit for the first time sought as a remedy the actual break-up of the company, and in particular the divestiture of the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) from AT&T [4:6].

 

MODIFIED FINAL JUDGMENT (AT & T DIVESTITURE) 修改后的最终判决

From the mid -to-late 20th century, AT & T was gaining too much monopolistic power in the telecommunication industry and at the same time, advancing technology spawned a new generation of companies unveiling innovative products. These companies had to fight AT & T every step of the way to get their new product into the market. Due to this, "the Justice Department once again investigated AT & T for possible antitrust abuse in 1974. The investigation lasted for seven years. Finally, in 1982, the department of Justice ruled that AT & T should split into multiple, smaller companies. Some of these new, smaller companies for example, those that provide local telephone service would continue to be regulated monopolies. Others would be open to competition"[1:115]. This ruling is called Modified Final Judgment

On January 8, 1982, AT&T and William Baxter of the U.S. Justice Department reached an agreement that forced AT&T to divest the RBOCs by January 1, 1984. Thus as of that date the twenty-two RBOCs were formed into seven regional holding companies (Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, BellSouth, Ameritech, U.S.West, Pacific Telesis, and Southwestern Bell). These divested companies were not allowed to provide long-distance services in their territories or manufacture telecommunication equipment, both of which were businesses that remained with AT&T. Likewise, AT&T was precluded from providing local telephone service in competition with the RBOCs and from acquiring stock in any of the RBOCs [4:7].

 

THE CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 当代管理框架

The Telecommunications Act of 1996, the first major revision of the country's telecommunications laws since the Communications Act of 1934, altered some features of the basic telecommunications system just described. One of the foremost goals of the 1996 Act was to promote competition in local telephone service. AT&T was allowed to return to the local Service market, while local Bell phone companies were allowed to enter the long-distance market and to merge with each other. In addition, the 1996 law created a "line sharing" scheme whereby market entrants would purchase the rights to use the "local loop or last mile" facilities owned by the local Bell companies and sell competitive local services. The 1996 Act also preempted all state and local barriers to entering the local phone service market, and since the passage of the 1996 Act the FCC has forborne from enforcing any restrictions on building or acquiring long-distance lines. Despite these substantial changes to the law, most believe the 1996 Act's effort to create local service competition was a failure. Whether due to the economics of local competition, or foot-dragging on the part of the local Bell Company, few viable local phone service companies have emerged since the passage of the Act.

The 1996 Act also failed to address the challenge of internet and broadband internet services. Pursuant to existing rules, telephone companies have long been regulated as common carriers, as discussed above. That meant that providers of DSL service - which runs over phone lines - were common carriers, while the status of cable operators who sell broadband services remained unclear. In 2002 FCC deemed cable broadband an unregulated "information service" not subject to common carriage rules, and it later classified DSL broadband similarly. In 2005, in the case of FCC v. Brand X, the United States Supreme Court upheld the FCC's right to categorize cable broadband providers as "information services." The practical import of these technical classifications has been to release broadband services from most anti-discrimination, common carriage or line-sharing obligations [4:9].

While no specific regime governed the internet, in the 1980s and 1990s, new "internet service providers" took advantage of quarantines placed on the Bells to offer dial-up internet services independent of the Bell system. In the early 2000s, as cable and DSL broadband providers replaced dialup ISPs, the issue of Bell and cable control over the vertical internet markets again arose. In the mid-2000s, the center of the network neutrality debate is a debate over the merits or problems with discriminatory carriage -- favoring some content or applications over others. Ironically, today's debates over network neutrality and discriminatory carriage echo the same concerns that first prompted calls to regulate telegraph companies in the 19th century.

 

CONCLUSION 结论

Telecommunications policy-makers are seeking to promote competition and liberalization, while assuring the provision of an integrated, global, communications infrastructure. Realization of these goals requires a strong centralized regulatory authority. In the US, the FCC's authority has been challenged by a series of decisions from companies like AT&T.

This paper examines the economics of telecommunication regulation in the United States and the history of this system in the US, and seeks to make the case for a strong centralized authority. The need for such authority is especially important in light of industry convergence and the growth of the Internet. With convergence, communications networks are becoming increasingly integrated with respect to the types of traffic handled, the types of facilities that support that traffic, and the geographic markets in which carriers participate. This increases the potential for spillover and coordination externalities, thereby increasing the risk and costs that heterogeneous local regulations will harm incentives for efficient infrastructure