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美国作业指导：高盛为区区10亿美元出卖了灵魂？
对于一家华尔街巨头来说，10亿美元并不算多。仅在去年，高盛的收入就高达120亿美元。
高盛应该反思一下这样的做法是否值当。
根据路透社周一发布的消息，2000-2008年间，高盛（Goldman Sachs）通过销售债务抵押证券（下称CDO）盈利10.2亿美元，最终引发了今天的“欺诈门”事件，使高盛曾经如日中天的声誉一落千丈。
对于一家华尔街巨头来说，10亿美元并不算多。仅在去年，高盛的收入就高达120亿美元。本周二，高盛按计划将公布今年第一季度的收入数据。
这些收入让高盛的利润曲线完美上升，很多银行家的钱包也鼓了起来，而它们只占高盛同期全部债务证券承销收入的13%。
然而上周五，美国证券监督交易委员会（SEC，下称美国证交会）宣布起诉高盛公司及一名副总裁之后，高盛股价急挫，市值蒸发了120亿美元，至本周一下午股价才终于趋稳。
美国证交会指控称，高盛涉嫌欺诈CDO产品的投资者，未向投资者披露保尔森基金做空该产品的关键性信息。投资者因此损失了10亿美元，而约翰•保尔森（John Paulson）的对冲基金则从中获利10亿美元。
面对证交会的指控，高盛不仅予以否认，而且发布了三份措辞强硬的声明作为回应。
高盛周一发布的声明称：“根据我们掌握的全部信息，我们认为高盛的行为完全正当，我们将采取必要手段，为高盛辩护，将真相告知大众，维护高盛的名誉。”
显得满腹冤屈的高盛在最新的声明中并没有为自己辩解，而是为CDO市场辩护。
高盛称：“美国证交会的陈述涉及2007年的一笔单项交易，所指控的一系列事实具有特殊性，在CDO市场中不具有普遍意义。”
这段表述很有意思，因为CDO市场早在2007年底便已崩盘，当时CDO投资者手里的3A级股票还不如印刷它们的纸张值钱。去年，市场上发行的CDO总价值仅为43亿美元，不及2006年或2007年的百分之一。
批评界预测，不管高盛及其他衍生品交易商怎么辩解，律师将把华尔街告上法庭。圣地亚哥大学法律与金融教授弗兰克• 帕诺依（Frank Partnoy）在周一的《金融时报》上撰文称，涉及上万亿美元的CDO产品可能面临类似的起诉。
高盛并不是最大的CDO承销商，却是重要的市场参与者。根据路透社消息，2006年高盛在全部CDO承销商中排名第11位，2007年则位列第6。#p#分页标题#e#
同一时期的顶级承销商还包括美林银行[Merrill Lynch，现归美国银行（Bank of America）所有]、花旗银行（Citigroup）、瑞信银行（Credit Suisse）、贝尔斯登[Bear Stearns，现归摩根大通公司（J.P. Morgan Chase）所有]，以及美联银行[Wachovia，去年被富国银行（Wells Fargo）收购]。
促使高盛不断寻求更大收益的原因有很多，其中之一，便包括通过显示其盈利能力以躲避步步逼近的次贷危机。
在一份2007年的备忘录中，高盛的抵押资本委员会对证交会指控的这类投资产品表示赞赏，称其“有助于高盛在不断成长的结构性金融产品市场中获得更大竞争优势。”
事实是，投资者逐渐明白他们购买的3A级股票并不安全，这一市场不但没有成长壮大，反而全线崩溃。
今天，到底还有什么是安全的？就连高盛曾经雪白无瑕的名誉，也靠不住了。
Did Goldman sell its soul for measly $1B?
Goldman Sachs has to be asking itself if it was all worth it.
The Wall Street powerhouse made just $1.02 billion in fees by selling collateralized debt obligations -- the complex debt structures at the center of a fraud case that now threatens to undermine the bank's immensely valuable reputation -- between 2000 and 2008, according to a note out Monday from ThomsonReuters.
A billion dollars isn't much money to the big Wall Street firm. Goldman made $12 billion last year and is scheduled to disclose Tuesday morning how many additional billions it raked in during the just-completed first quarter.
While those fees no doubt padded the bank's profits and the wallets of many individual bankers, they account for just 13% of the money Goldman made underwriting debt securities over that period.
By contrast, Goldman (GS, Fortune 500) lost $12 billion of its market value after the Securities and Exchange Commission announced its civil suit against the firm and one of its vice presidents Friday. The stock was flat in late afternoon trading Monday.
The SEC alleges the firm defrauded investors in a CDO by failing to disclose that a hedge fund that was betting against the investment was helping to select the bonds tied to the CDO. Investors ended up losing $1 billion -- and the hedge fund, run by John Paulson, walked away with the identical amount.
To say that the firm denies wrongdoing would be a major understatement. Goldman has now put out three statements sketching out its defense to the charges.
"http://www.ukassignment.org/liuxuezuoyedaixie/meiguozuoyedaixie/Based on all that we have learned, we believe that the firm's actions were entirely appropriate, and will take all steps necessary to defend the firm and its reputation by making the true facts known," Goldman said in a statement Monday.#p#分页标题#e#
Indeed, Goldman is feeling so righteous about its actions that it took a detour from defending itself in its latest statement to defend the CDO market itself.
"The SEC complaint is related to a single transaction in 2007 and involves a highly particularized set of alleged facts," Goldman asserts. "It would not appear to have broad ramifications for the CDO market generally."
This is an interesting claim, given that the CDO market collapsed at the end of 2007 when it became clear that the triple-A securities sold to CDO buyers weren't worth the paper they were printed on. CDO issuance fell to $4.3 billion last year from more than 100 times that amount in both 2006 and 2007.
What's more, skeptics are predicting lawyers will beat a path to Wall Street regardless of what Goldman and the other derivatives dealers say. "A trillion dollars or more of CDOs could face similar litigation," wrote University of San Diego law and finance professor Frank Partnoy in the Financial Times Monday.
Goldman wasn't the biggest CDO underwriter, but it was a major player. The firm was the No. 11 underwriter of CDOs in 2006 and the No. 6 underwriter in 2007, ThomsonReuters said.
Other top underwriters over that period include the likes of Merrill Lynch (now owned by Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500)), Citigroup (C, Fortune 500), Credit Suisse (CS), Bear Stearns (now part of JPMorgan Chase (JPM, Fortune 500)) and Wachovia (acquired last year by Wells Fargo (WFC, Fortune 500)).
And Goldman was looking to build on its gains, presumably for reasons ranging from bragging rights to a desire to hedge itself against the approaching subprime meltdown.
A 2007 memo to the firm's mortgage capital committee advocated deals such as the one the SEC sued the firm over, saying it "helps position Goldman to compete指导美国作业more aggressively in the growing market for synthetics written on structured products."
As it turned out, that market melted down altogether rather than growing, as investors caught on to the fact that the triple-A securities they'd been sold weren't safe.
But nowadays, what is? Certainly not Goldman's once pristine reputation.
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