1, Introduction引言
股东大会决议作为一种团体行为,其效力是否被法律所承认涉及到多方当事人的利益,股东身份是股东行使诉权的必要条件。根据世界大多数国家公司立法的规定,股东直接诉讼的主体通常都为公司的股东,只要对公司决议具有诉讼利益的任何股东均可对有瑕疵的公司决议提起诉讼。
Resolution of the meeting as a group behavior , its effectiveness is to be recognized by the law involve multi-party interests, identity is a necessary condition for the exercise of shareholders' rights of appeal shareholders. Company under the provisions of the legislation in most countries of the world , the main shareholder of direct action is usually to shareholders , any shareholder resolution as long as the company may have an interest litigation firm resolution to have the flawed proceedings .
传统公司法理论认为,公司具有独立于公司股东的法律人格,两者皆是具有完整法律主体资格的独立主体。公司意志不是股东个人意志的直接体现或者简单叠加,而是一种独立于股东个人意志之外的团体意志。
Traditional law theory that the company has an independent legal personality in the company's shareholders , both independent body with full legal personality of the subject . Company will not directly reflect the personal will of the shareholders or simply overlay, but an independent body outside the will of the individual will of the shareholders . But the company will , after all, is based on majority rule system of capital formation by all the shareholders , the shareholders will largely affect the company will, which inevitably makes the company would infringe the legitimate rights and interests of some shareholders . Pursuant to Rule 215 of the "Company Law ", the company in violation of the law shall bear civil liability .
2 , the body正文
各国公司立法之所以做出这样的规定,不仅因为股东大会是股东行使权利的重要场所,股东大会决议对股东权益的实现起着至关重要的作用,还因为股东对股东大会决议享有合理期待权。股东大会作为公司的意思机关,有义务为公司目标或公司设立基础的实现严格依照法律法规和公司章程的规定对公司的运营做出适当的决策。
The reason why the countries the company to make such legislative provisions , not only because of the general meeting of shareholders to exercise their rights is an important place , resolutions of general meetings play a vital role in achieving equity , but also because the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders to enjoy the right to a reasonable expectation . As the company's shareholders' meeting meant organ , the obligation to establish the basis of the company's goals or the Company in accordance with the strict implementation of laws, regulations and the Articles of Association of the company's operations to make appropriate decisions. Companies in violation of the provisions of laws and regulations and the Articles of Association of the company made improper resolution undermines the general meeting of shareholders on the company 's expectations , causing damage to shareholders' equity. Therefore , pursuant to which the shareholders can sue the resolution of the company .
Two Schools agreed that the traditional theory of the Act : Directors as the company's agent, fiduciary duty to deal with the company commitment and fiduciary duties relative who think only and does not include the company 's shareholders. [ 1 ] This theory is clearly not conducive to preventing abuses of directors , is not conducive to the protection of minority shareholders' interests . Therefore , national legislation in the gradual emergence of the company directors case directly to shareholders the burden of obligation. China's " Company Law" Section 153 gives shareholders sue directors , senior management rights , to more effectively limit violations and maintain the interests of the shareholders of directors . But the " Company Law" and no cause of action in this type of litigation make specific provisions, in view of the growing number of infringement cases directors , China's " Company Law" it is necessary to further clarify the requirements of this type of litigation causes of action .
From the date of the company arising from the system of corporate governance is to jurisprudence , and economists have been keen on the subject of the study. Currently corporate governance issues are mostly dual structure of phase separation of ownership and management by the company generated . This proposition was first proposed by Berle and Means professor. In 1993 they released "Modern Corporation and Private Property ," a book to prove " all separation and control " (separation of ownership and control) of the Companies Authority and operated by a conflict of interest with shareholders consequent corporate governance proposition States is still the center of discussion of corporate governance and legal reform. [ 1 ] Since the 20th century , equity firms increasingly fragmented internal corporate governance model to the " Board of centrism " shift from " general meeting of centrism ." This means that the status of the company directors and governance activities increasingly improved, and the opportunity to express the will of the shareholders , but increasingly limited. In practice, more performance is the major shareholder are both directors, supervisors , managers and other positions , they use a special status in the management of the company , contrary to its obligations as a good administrators abuse , harm the interests of the company and minority shareholders . The minority shareholders , or the amount of shares due to restrictions by its content , can not get to compete with the power of large shareholders in corporate governance structure, resulting in difficult to maintain the legitimate rights and interests through the company's internal relief mechanism . In the case of the development of the company board of directors has gradually become the center of power , how to protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders, how to prevent directors, managers , senior managers abuse of power has become a national company legislation and practice of efforts to solve the problem.
Model of corporate governance is closely related to the form of ownership structure , different ownership structure produce different model of corporate governance , legal issues raised correspondingly different. In other countries, the ownership structure is primarily a business concern theoretical proposition economists , economists as the logical premise of the ownership structure of theoretical research enterprise for a long time . Although many studies and literature on the ownership structure is still made by economists , but the problem is no longer the shareholding structure of the patent economists , and slowly entered the study scope of legal scholars. However , our current ownership structure will study a variable as corporate governance is also limited to the economics profession . Our economists began to reveal the Chinese company is characterized by a strong concentration of ownership structure , under this ownership structure, control problems between the shareholders and the general shareholders' equity balance protection of the increasingly prominent , but economists improve the corporate governance structure through equity efforts can only improve on the shareholding structure itself , and by building and improving the legal system in order to achieve effective protection of the general shareholders' equity of the tireless efforts of the academic effects also need law .
According to the research scholars , the ownership structure is the ratio or relationship equity " account for each shareholder of the company, which has two meanings : one is funded ratio scale structure that shareholders invested in the total share capital embodied ; Second, the right relationship that shareholder rights allocated according to the proportion of their capital relations in the control of the company in the . " [ 2 ] The former focuses on the economic significance of the ownership structure , which focuses on the legal significance of shareholding structure. This article refers to the ownership structure refers only to the latter , only the right to investigate the ownership structure of the allocation problem .
Ownership structure can be divided into two types : one is dispersed ownership structure, the ownership structure is more common in Britain and the U.S. company ; Second concentrated ownership structure, the ownership structure of most of the world equity types. Analysis of the company's shareholding structure of modern , generally considered the ownership of shares in the company is highly fragmented , with emphasis on control of the Company and therefore turned to professional managers from investors. But then some of the empirical research but then challenged the traditional understanding that in addition to countries with good shareholder protection measures , there are few large companies shareholding structure is very fragmented. In dispersed ownership structure , the separation of owners and operators , the management company who enjoy the right to the greatest extent , because inconsistent with the interests of owners and managers often generate agency problems in corporate governance . Most companies in Britain and other countries , for lack of oversight problems caused by dispersed shareholders to replace the supervisory system and the introduction of performance-based pay system managers to solve agency problems between owners and managers . In the concentrated ownership structure , the control of the company often lies in the hands of a few , these few people may include directors , senior management, controlling shareholders , etc., but in reality these people tend to be fairly close relationship with people , so they exercised options content tends to be consistent , so there controlling shareholders and the general shareholders inequality. At this point the biggest problem of corporate governance is no longer the agency relationship between owners and managers , but how to control the controlling shareholder of the exploitation of minority shareholders' rights issues.#p#分页标题#e#
Analysis of the shareholding structure of the company , mostly concentrated ownership structure , in which the listed company is particularly prominent. Features ownership structure of listed companies showed the following aspects : First, tradable shares of listed companies accounted for the majority of the total ; Second, the state-owned shares has been in a holding position ; Three is a very high proportion of corporate shares . More specifically, the issue of shareholding structure of the Company arising from the following aspects : First , China's " Company Law" and " Securities Act " adopt the principle of "one share , one vote" , which means a high concentration of the shareholding structure of the large shareholders, " dominance" , so that it will direct the company will rise , and the wishes of the minority shareholders are often ignored. Secondly, the major shareholders control the board of listed companies. In accordance with "Company Law" Shareholders' Meeting has the right to nominate board members. Therefore, in highly concentrated ownership structure , the board can easily become the largest shareholder of the Board at this time, the independence of the company's operations would be threatened. Finally , a major shareholder controlled companies listed on the Board of Supervisors . According to the "Company Law " stipulates that the Board of Supervisors is the supervisory authority AG company , the shareholders' meeting to nominate a member of the Supervisory Board , which created favorable conditions for large shareholders control the board of supervisors , and the minority shareholders of the company's operations is difficult to achieve effective supervision. Based on the above analysis, the concentration of the ownership structure of the company, enough to make major shareholders to decide on any operating and supervisory authority , the role of minority shareholders in the company's decision-making and operational processes can be described as minimal. In this form of company , the interests of minority shareholders is difficult to get effectively maintained , the controlling shareholder can easily damage their legitimate rights and interests , the company is no longer a contradiction contradiction between all shareholders and managers but rather use the controlling shareholder personal gain and to protect the interests of the company or other shareholders conflicts of control, the controlling shareholder of the abuse of power at this time control , suppress the controlling shareholder moral hazard become the biggest obstacle to the protection of minority shareholders' rights, abuse of power and control of the controlling shareholder , the controlling shareholder of moral hazard inhibiting effective mechanism that is legally binding . Specifically, the legal norms can be suppressed from the controlling shareholder of the abuse of power in three aspects : First, the legal norms to limit the controlling shareholder can take control of the cost and difficulty by controlling shareholders ; Second , legal norms can affect the controlling shareholder content- control rights to control access to the controlling shareholder ; Third, legal norms can be constrained by the controlling shareholder of the company employees affected organ tissue content and level of participation . Which gives shareholders the right to appeal that direct action is the controlling shareholder of an effective way to conduct legal norms constraints. Shareholders can sue for damages their legitimate rights and interests of the controlling shareholder , to a certain extent, increase the cost of controlling shareholder abuse of control , thereby reducing moral hazard and prevent damage to the interests of minority shareholders .
Since the 1980s , the world has entered a round of tax reform wave. Personal income tax reform to broaden the tax base which is mainly manifested in the following two aspects : the first is to broaden the extension , which is to broaden the tax ; followed broaden connotation , that is, reducing various tax incentives. I think that these two aspects can be to broaden the tax base , plug tax loopholes.
First, the current state of our welfare is not taxed , so in terms of broadening the tax base of the extension , the measures are the most effective and easy to attach welfare tax. Since China adopted the classification of income tax system mode , for each positive taxable income were cited , but in law enforcement , this list will make some difficult taxable income included the scope of taxation . And, for the payment of its own funds if such units subsidies , in-kind benefits, and workers received , securities and other income should be included in the scope of taxation is controversial . This situation exists for the taxpayer provides the possibility of tax avoidance . Due to the tax on fringe benefits tax provisions are not clear , making the taxpayer avoidance performance in this area is particularly prominent. What is the additional benefit of it ? How do we define ? Far, there is not a unified view. The usual approach is to define it as other than wages and salaries due to the monetization of employees have provided services to be provided or obtained for all interests. Additional benefits have money , goods or services in the form in general , but in kind , and the most common form of currency . Can be expressed as specific companies or institutions to provide free medical care , transport, housing benefits, free lunches for employees, a bathroom , a gym and other public facilities , and so on . Theoretically, if the fringe benefit tax will cause employees are not allowed to obtain a considerable distortion compensation in form . Employer benefits in the form of fringe benefits account for a larger share ( cash less ) , it will have a greater economic distortions and on the income tax base erosion. Additional benefits and no taxes will cause a certain income groups among the different income groups or non-uniform distribution , like the distribution of the tax burden does not match with the original intention of the legislator . There are indications that high- income earners compared to low-income people are more likely to get fringe benefits , and this part of the tax group is more capacity and conditions , which means that , if the additional tax benefits will widen unfair income distribution . Therefore, it is necessary for the fringe benefits tax. In fact, some foreign countries such as Australia and New Zealand, the country early in the 1980s had begun to fringe benefits tax it. And generally considered different , they are not on the staff benefits are taxed , but only on the fringe benefits tax levied on employers alone and ourselves. In our case, since the personal income tax law which " wages and salaries " project had already been included in the fringe benefit tax category , there is no need for a separate taxing fringe benefits as long as the resulting sum to total personal income which can be imposed .
Secondly, in terms of broadening the tax base connotation , mainly to reduce or cancel such a variety of tax deductions , exemptions , credits and other tax expenditures as specified in the Income Tax Act . China's personal income tax law is not only tax relief policies more, and loopholes . First, numerous tax breaks , tax cuts have a duty there , and some of which classifies unclear, such as subsidies , allowances, bonuses and other exempt items would be difficult to define, bad master . Followed by the tax deduction messy unclear, proportional deduction , individual deduction , deduction , and so fixed . And in addition to the tax , had done a lot of individual preferential tax provisions , making the already cluttered more preferential tax policies are not standardized . Therefore, you should not standardized for tax relief tax incentives for further specification or deleted, and modified as appropriate for Necessary reserved .
Damages shareholder complaint refers to the shareholders of the Company due to other shareholders in particular acts of violation of the provisions of the controlling shareholder of the "Company Law " or suffer damage when the articles of association filed suit. Generally believed that as long as the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders other shareholders suffered acts of abuse against shareholders' rights , the shareholders would be entitled to damages filed its complaint . But the company judicial practice , there is little abuse of shareholders' rights against the rights of the other shareholders in general shareholder happen , the common shareholder lawsuit for damages against the Company's senior management are instituted proceedings. Senior management as an agent of the company's affairs , to have more than the average shareholder company information, enjoy more than the general shareholders ' rights, and therefore , their chances of abuse of shareholders' rights more and more likely. Legislation to prevent foreign companies senior management abused the rights of shareholders , most of the company's senior manager director of the provisions of the fiduciary duty similar to the fiduciary obligation . Generally, fiduciary duty " includes both a duty of care and duty of loyalty , the former requires senior management to run the company when any prudent person under the same circumstances given the same precautions operated by its ; latter prohibit self-dealing and abuse of rights " [ 2 ] . Although China's " Company Law" Article 20 pairs circumstances shareholders against abuse of shareholders' rights of other shareholders be prescribed , and gives victims the right to petition the court relief to shareholders , but the provisions of the senior management of the company and other shareholders owe a fiduciary duty . Lack of legislation on the company to increase the degree of difficulty and complexity of the judicial practice of senior management of infringement cases heard , is not conducive to speedy resolution of such cases , therefore, China's " Company Law" in the future to improve the process should be given to senior management Meanwhile people more rights provisions corresponding obligations to prevent abuse of rights.#p#分页标题#e#
Judicial practice, the company will not only infringe equity shareholders of the Company , and may for other civil rights equity shareholders of the Company other than damage. However, only when the damage to the company 's shareholders ' equity shareholders enjoy the company can sue for compensation for damages under the direct shareholder litigation areas , while damage to other company shareholders' equity other than civil rights , the shareholders can only be brought in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code general civil tort lawsuit . Shareholder rights because the latter is irrelevant , therefore , not discussed in this article . And damage to the complaint filed shareholder equity compensation scope of protection to the laws, regulations or the Articles of Association shall prevail , as long as the company's behavior on the laws, regulations or the Articles of Association confer equity shareholders of damage , it can damage the shareholders the company filed the damage behavior v. compensation . But such proceedings is ultimately a tort action , it must comply with the infringement complaint Four Elements . Specifically, subject to the following four points : First, the company implemented a harm behavior ; Second, the company has a fault subjective ; Third Equity damage ; Fourth, shareholders' equity and the company suffer harm behaviors have a causal relationship . When these four elements are met , the shareholders can sue the company .
Will determine the resolution of the shareholders of the company to appeal the eligibility plaintiff does not dispute the basic academics , but some scholars believe : In addition to the Company's shareholders , the company can give interested parties a limited degree of qualification of plaintiff 's complaint to the company 's resolution invalid . [ 1 ] In this view : the right to sue the interested parties can not be generalized and should be distinguished from the interests of the appeal . Resolution of the meeting of the world does not have the effect , under normal circumstances resolutions of the shareholders of the company interested party does not produce any effect. Therefore , interested parties on General Assembly resolutions have no interest litigation , the plaintiff can not become eligibility . However, if the resolution of the meeting became the legal relationship between the company and the establishment of a third person or effective elements , the third person of the shareholders' meeting that there is a valid legal interest . At this time , the company stakeholders can become invalid plaintiff shareholders' meeting resolution of complaints . But the scholars denied the plaintiff qualified interested parties to the shareholders 'meeting of the revocation of the complaint that the revocation of the resolution of complaints generally minor complaint because of procedural flaws , combined with the shareholders' meeting does not have effect on the world , can not be bound by the interested parties revocation of the plaintiff 's appeal of eligibility , so the company does not have the resolution of the interested parties . But I believe that the shareholders of the company will mean authorities as the company itself does not have an independent legal entity qualified to make the ultimate resolution of the general meeting be attributed to the company , the company is a manifestation of the will of the shareholders' meeting resolution of legal responsibility should be borne by the company . The third resolution interests harmed by the company , its main obligations for the company , the third party may bring an action against the company under general tort and not sue directly on the resolution of the meeting .
3 , Hidden shareholders and significant shareholders.隐名股东与显名股东
Generally, equity lawsuit plaintiffs for damages as long as you can with a shareholder , which academia rarely controversial. However, there are a lot of companies judicial practice " abnormal " shareholders , such as hidden shareholders , significant shareholders , or because of flaw shareholder equity transfer , inheritance , court enforced the subject of rights arising from the situation changes , then how to determine the relevant qualification plaintiff it ? The author believes that the law of equity damages lawsuit plaintiffs main qualification without restriction in that : the plaintiff does not have any shareholders holding time , or whether there are restrictions stake of voting , but does not represent all of the above shareholders have filed Equity eligibility lawsuit damages.
" No relief is no right ," Throughout the national legislation , all provisions of the shareholders' rights at the same time provides rich content shareholder litigation system , in order to achieve the legislative purpose of the protection and the rights of shareholders . Shareholders have the right to appeal is the primary condition of shareholder litigation shareholder Without this prerequisite , the shareholders will not be eligible to the courts . According to the Company Law Litigation theory and the theory of shareholder equity shareholders of the right to appeal refers infringed its right to apply to the court according to the law in order to protect their legitimate referee interests . The right of appeal includes two aspects , one is the right to appeal procedural sense, refers to the plaintiff is entitled to ask the court to exercise judicial power , in order to initiate proceedings to resolve disputes of rights ; Second, the right to appeal the substantive law sense refers to the plaintiff specific legal status of any claim or effect on the substantive law . Both constitute the complete right to appeal directly to shareholders litigation .
But why shareholders entitled to the right to appeal it? Academics from two angles substantive law and procedural law on the legal basis for starting the shareholders the right to appeal generated a lot of research . In terms of substantive law , mainly , " said shareholder equity " and " Company Contract" two views . [ 1 ] The former dual structure of corporate governance from companies separation of ownership and management of starting a business that the company is a form of separation of ownership and management generated . Shareholders are the ultimate owners of the company , but the limited liability shareholders desire , the law would give the company an independent personality , giving shareholders the right to operate the shareholders and shareholder rights restrictions . In theory, the damage caused by the company's interests will inevitably harm the interests of the shareholders , so shareholders can sue based on the fact of damage . The latter property departure from the company that is the essence of the status of the beneficiary shareholders , the shareholders may exercise this position requires companies the right to sue . According to this theory , the individual shareholders, directors , senior management, controlling shareholders and other forms of contract with the company to produce a series of association , the association is a balance of interests between the stakeholders of the contract process. When the legal relationship between them and adjust the company shall be bound by the contract , resulting in damage to the legitimate interests of shareholders disputes , shareholder lawsuit can be filed directly to shareholders based on tort litigation or default.
From the perspective of basic procedural law , civil procedure law theory interest litigation theory and the theory of proper party shareholder litigation provides direct support for the procedural law . Interest litigation is when civil rights are being infringed or the occurrence of civil disputes with others, requires the use of civil proceedings shall be the necessity of relief . [ 2 ] interest litigation is due to the legal entity or entities to realize the relationship between the plaintiff claims to be in danger or when generating unease , the plaintiff sought relief in the interests of the court referee . Functional benefits that would require action lawsuit Relief Relief range of things into action , things will not need relief exclude litigation relief. Determined whether the interest litigation , first under the premise of " actionable items " carried out . Generally considered actio benefit obligation due to the settlement of which have reached with complaints interests. Benefits arising vv confirmation is often due to the defendant's conduct makes substantive legal relationship between the plaintiff's substantive rights or dispute between the plaintiff and defendant , which the plaintiff is necessary to confirm the decision to remove the use of this controversial state. In direct action shareholders, the shareholders entitled shareholders by investing identity , based on some of its property in exchange for the corresponding options when their rights are violated and can not be solved through self-help , it is entitled to request public relief , the shareholders of this have an interest in the proceedings . Therefore , the legitimate interests of the other shareholders are shareholders, directors infringement and has sought public relief when necessary , the shareholder may own direct action brought on behalf of shareholders .
Standing Theory refers to specific litigation, litigants should have an interest in the subject of legal proceedings , you can sue an individual based on this , and enjoy the proceedings related rights , undertake corresponding obligations. Eligibility on the basis of the parties , that is to determine whether the parties eligibility basis. Traditional theory proper party is from the point of view of substantive law , the eligibility entirely attributed to the management of the foundation or on the disposition of the substantive law . Modern civil action theory is generally believed that the management or disposition of the complaint is the proper party payment basis . However, the parties consider its appeal lawsuit also formed the basis of eligibility and confirmation of existence unreasonable . Effectiveness of the formation of the appellate decision has dilated , except be binding on the parties , but the third party also has binding effect . Therefore , the formation of the complaint in the case law expressly only special provisions may only lift , and the legal form of appeal for the parties also made clear that under normal circumstances . Tong said that the party forming the complaint whether eligibility should first be determined according to the provisions of the law . If the law does not provide , then the people have the right to form or on the formation of the right people have the right to manage eligibility plaintiff . V. recognized by the parties want the court to confirm a legal fact or whether there is a legal relationship , and to determine the legal relationship between the parties , thus subject to the legal relationship uncertain benefits . Generally believed that people have a legal interest in the decision to confirm the eligibility is regardless of their party is entitled to the management or disposition .#p#分页标题#e#
V. Type shareholder lawsuit is nothing more than direct benefit of the provisions of the legislation of the company , confirmed the complaint and the complaint form . In this regard , this article will discuss in detail in the third chapter , they will not expand here . Simply put, the direct action of various types of company shareholders can get legislation exists to support the theory proper party . Equity lawsuit for damages as actio , the parties to the litigation object enjoy disposition ; company revoked the resolution of the complaint as a complaint form , the parties have formed their rights by the relevant laws and regulations ; company 's complaint resolution invalid recognized as a complaint , the parties are to confirm the judgment on the legal interests of the people there .
Implicit is the actual name of the shareholders in the register of members , but not funded , industry and commerce administration authorities for registration of company investors . Its corresponding concept that is significant shareholders , although not refer to actual contribution , but in the register of shareholders of the company or business administration authority , nominally shareholders entitled to qualified persons . Implicit shareholders with significant shareholders in the form of a commission contract generally agreed rights and obligations as well as to participate in the company's affairs in the form of both sides. Our company legislation does not carry out the provisions of dormant shareholders , there are two forms of judicial practice implicitly company shareholders : one is the actual investor in the name of significant shareholder of the company personally involved in the management and operation of the appropriate exercise of shareholders' rights , and certain obligations ; another contributor is the actual commission contract by significant shareholders of the company involved in management of affairs , but the actual investors commissioned by the agreed contract information on the company the right to know , and get dividend distribution companies. Implicit shareholders arises , in most cases is to circumvent the law for the purpose , such as to circumvent legal restrictions on investment in the subject or field , but there are some hidden shareholders due to other reasons not to violate laws and regulations , such as the protection of their privacy .
4 , the former shareholders and new shareholders前任股东与新任股东
To determine whether the dormant shareholders entitled to damages lawsuit filed stake , the first hidden shareholders are entitled to respond to shareholders' eligibility to be defined. The above analysis , some hidden shareholders to circumvent the law and conceal the situation at their own expense , in which case is prohibited by law , and therefore should not be considered at this time shareholder qualification anonymous shareholders, otherwise it will encourage investors to avoid the arrogance of the law. For legitimate grounds for shareholders eligible to conceal the actual investor 's own expense , from the perspective of the following : First, the first form of anonymous contributors actually involved in the management of its business activities , and assume certain obligations , and therefore without prejudice to the interests of the Company and other third parties , if Cain shareholders can prove that it is the actual investor , you should recognize its qualification as a shareholder , shareholders' right to appeal. When the legitimate rights and interests of such dormant shareholders have been violated from the company , directors or other shareholders of the company , its equity can sue for damages in accordance with law . For the second form of dormant shareholders , because shareholders are not directly involved in the hidden affairs of the company , in the form it is difficult to discern whether the shareholders of the Company , but only to prove the commission contract between the commission and its significant shareholders of However, the relationship between the commission should follow the principles of civil law contract , the parties only have the effect of constraints , and the third party does not have any legal effect. Therefore , there is no relationship between significant shareholders enjoyed a variety of shareholder rights, including the right to appeal , including , but hidden between the actual shareholders are not entitled to any shareholder and investor rights , can not lift the equity lawsuit for damages .
Through the analysis of dormant shareholders above shows that significant shareholders are not actual investors , based on the contractual relationship between the actual investor , became nominally shareholders. The above analysis, with only nominal shareholder participation in corporate affairs without explicit actual shareholders , neither the exercise of shareholders' rights in the management process of the company does not assume any obligation to shareholders , so it does not have the appeal filed by the plaintiff damages the body equity qualifications. And has a nominal shareholder participation in corporate governance practice , the exercise of shareholders' rights and assume certain obligations significant shareholders , according to the agreed contract entrusted to exercise the appropriate rights of shareholders , may bring equity lawsuit for damages .
5 ,Conclusions结论
Subscribed capital contribution defect refers to when a certain contribution in the establishment of the investor in the company , after its establishment, the investor shareholders qualifications , but without the provisions of laws and regulations or the articles of association of the actual payment of the contributions to the shareholders , including the form of money funded shareholder false investment , reject and delay investment, capital flight or non-monetary form of capital contribution to shareholder value is not real situations such assessments . Company Law academic and judicial practice, the general said: flaw shareholder contribution is not entirely due to not enjoy the full rights of shareholders, but only the right to share in their respective capital contributions , mainly refers to the section entitled dividends dividends and voting . China's " Company Law" Article 28 , Article 31 states: Shareholder fails to capital contributions have funded , we should first make up the funding , and to other companies liable to pay the full contribution of the shareholders. In accordance with these provisions , the shareholders invested flaw does not lead to the loss of a shareholder . Therefore , when the flaw shareholder unduly prejudice the legitimate interests from within the company, which filed a lawsuit plaintiff still has the qualification .
As previously mentioned , the equity lawsuit for damages , including damages for shareholders complained compensation to the company for damages lawsuit , appeal to the director of the three types of damages , the defendant corresponding three lawsuits were shareholders of the company , the company , a director of the Company. Of Article 20 of the "Company Law" , Article 113 , and Article 153 , respectively, provide a direct legal basis for the above three types of litigation.
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