第一篇关于资本结构的论文是由米勒和莫迪里阿尼在1958年写的,显示在一些受到限制情况下,公司杠杆作用价值的影响是无形的;从概念上讲,公司的价值并不取决于满足某些特定条件的资本结构决策。那是因为不切实际的假设在无关紧要的理论中,资本结构研究催生了其他理论。
根据传统的(或静态的)贸易理论(TOT),公司通过比较债务的税收优惠选择最优资本结构,破产成本和代理成本的债务和股票,也就是说债务的纠正作用和股权信息债务比外部抵押资产的净值成本花费更大这一事实(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Titman, 1984.)。
贸易理论认为,一个公司调整到一个最佳的杠杆效率受到三个因素的影响即税收、财务困境成本和代理成本。 Baxter (1967)认为广泛使用债务增加了破产的机会,因为债权人会要求额外的风险溢价。他说当债务成本变得比税收优势更大时公司就不应该使用债务了。
关于资本结构论文-Papers On Capital Structure
The first paper on capital structure was written by Miller and Modigliani in 1958, Showing that subject to some restrictive situation, the impact of leveraging on the worth of firm is immaterial; the conceptually provided that the worth of firm is not dependent upon the capital structure decision given that certain conditions are met. Because of the unrealistic assumptions in MM irrelevance theory, research on capital structure gave birth to other theories.
According to the traditional (or static) trade-of theory (TOT), firms select optimal capital structure by comparing the tax benefits of the debt, the costs of bankruptcy and the costs of agency of debt and equity, that is to say the corrective role of debt and the fact that debt effects from informational cost than outside equity. (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Titman, 1984.)
The Trade Off theory says that a firms adjustment toward an optimal leverage is influenced by three factors namely taxes, costs of financial distress and agency costs. Baxter (1967) argued that the extensive use of debt increases the chances of bankruptcy because of which creditors demand extra risk premium. He said that firms should not use debt beyond the point where the cost of debt becomes larger than the tax advantage.
In the so-called Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), because of asymmetries of information between insiders and outsiders, the company will prefer to be financed first by internal resources, then by debt and finally by stockholders’ equity. The debt ratio depends then on the degree of information asymmetry, on the capacity of self-financing and on the various constraints which the company meets in the access to the various sources of financing. So, in the pecking order world, observed leverage reflects the past profitability and investment opportunities of the companies.
The dynamic trade-off theory (DTOT) tries a compromise between TOT and POT (Fischer et al., 1989; Leland, 1994, 1998[1]). Although, due to information asymmetries, market imperfections and transaction costs, many companies allow their leverage ratios to drift away from their targets for a time, when the distance becomes large enough managers take steps to move their companies back toward the targets. While the POT explains short-run deviation from the target, the traditional TOT holds in the long run. Following this approach, leverage must converge toward a target leverage ratio. That would no be the case following POT because managers make no effort to turn around changes in leverage.
Two additional theories also reject the idea of timely meeting toward a target leverage ratio. According to the theories of market timing and inertia, the capital structure is the result at a given time of an historical process. Supporters of the market timing approach (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Korajczyk et al., 1991; Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Jung et al., 1996; Loughran et al., 1994; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) argue that companies will sell overpriced equity shares. Company’s share prices will fluctuate around their factual value, and managers inclined to issue shares when the market-to-book ratio is high. A small debt ratio must thus follow a long period of high market-to-book ratio. According to the managerial inertia approach (Welch, 2004) companies do not adjust their debt ratio to the fluctuations of the market value of their equity. High market-to-book ratio must thus be accompanied by small debt.
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that chief financial officers in the USA express concern about earnings’ volatility in capital structure choices. According to Mohammad M. Omran and John Pointon (2009) study, one of our issues of interest is whether debt is negatively associated with earnings’ volatility, in which case firms react to the risk, and manage it by reducing debt. On the other hand, if debt is found to be positively associated with earnings’ volatility, then they do not appear to manage the risk.
Ayesha Mazhar and Mohamed Nisar (1997) have discussed the determinants of capital structure of Pakistani firms. They selected a sample from Pakistani companies registered on Islamabad Stock Exchange. The sample is divided into two sub-samples of private and government owned companies to make comparison between both sectors. The sample comprised 91 Pakistani companies out of which 80 companies are private and 11 are government owned covering the period of 1999–2006. They have taken debt to equity as a proxy of leverage of a firm, and tangibility of assets, profitability, size, growth, tax provision and return on assets as independent variables. They use correlation to determine the degree of association between different variables. Spearmen correlation is used for all independent variables association with dependent variables. Regression is also used to measure the relationship between dependent and independent variables.
Attaullah shah and saifullah khan (2007) they used two variants of penal data i.e. constant coefficient model and fixed effect model to calculate the determinants of capital structure of Karachi Stock Exchange listed non-financial firm’s from1994 to2002. Pooled regression investigation was applied with the hypothesis that there were no industry or time effects. Though, by means of fixed effect dummy variable regression, the coefficients for an amount of industries were significant displaying there were significant industry effects later we accepted the late model for our investigation. He had measured effect of seven explanatory variables is measured on leverage ratio which is designed by dividing the total debt by total assets.
Safdar Ali Butt and ArshadHasan (2009) had explores the association between capital structure and corporate governance of stock exchange listed companies in an equity market. The study considered the period of 2002 to 2005 for which 58 randomly selected non-financial listed companies from Karachi Stock Exchange has been investigated by using multivariate regression line analysis with fixed effect model method. Managerial ownership has negative relationship with debt to equity ratio indicating that concentration of ownership induces the managers to lower the gearing levels. Institutional ownership has positive relationship with capital structure which is consistent with corporate governance philosophy but this relation is statistically insignificant. Traditional determinants of capital structure like size and profitability have significantly effect on corporate financing decisions. Profitability is negatively related with debt to equity ratio and it is consistent with pecking order hypothesis. Similarly, size has positive relationship which shows that large firms can arrange debt financing due to long term Relationship and better collateral offering.
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